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This document  reports findings from a Rapid Evidence 
Assessment conducted on the role of mass and social media 
during and after terrorist events. It is designed to bring 
together and synthesize insights and evidence from the 
available published research literature to inform future policy 
and practice development. By promoting understanding of 
how different forms of mediated communication shape what 
happens in the aftermath of terror events, the work seeks 
to reflect changes in both the conduct of terrorism and the 
contemporary information environment. In particular, the 
spread of social media has had disruptive and transformative 
impacts upon press and broadcast journalism, and the ways 
that terrorist violence is performed. 
THIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IS ORGANIZED AROUND THREE PRINCIPAL 
SECTIONS:
1. An overview of the relationships between terrorist violence and media, and 
how these have been influenced by changes to the media ecosystem.
2.  A brief outline of the key typical developments that take place in particular 
time periods as one moves further away from the occurrence of the original 
violence.
3. Recommendations for police, government and others involved in public 
safety provision, in terms of what strategic communications postures they 
can adopt to limit the impacts and harms of terror attacks.
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An increasingly complex and multi-polar media 
environment has to be navigated by policy-makers, 
practitioners and members of the public when a 
terror event  occurs. This is significant because of the 
diversity of communicative actions performed via 
mainstream media and social media, some of which 
will support the interests of police and governments, 
whilst others will amplify the harms of the violence 
committed by the perpetrators. The increasing 
volume of communication enables different 
groups to develop alternative interpretations and 
framings of the same event. As a consequence, 
there are typically multiple narratives and accounts 
circulating in the post-event environment, which can 
be more or less influential upon the construction of 
collective understandings and public definitions of 
the situation.
Harm is an important orienting principle for the 
analysis. It captures how the tenor and tone of 
political reaction to an event can alter and shape its 
overall impact.  This has direct policy relevance in so 
far as authorities cannot control all of the messaging 
following a terror incident, but rather their strategic 
and tactical communications can make a material 
difference to the overall prevalence and distribution 
of the harms induced. 
A key finding is that the management of post-event 
situations has been relatively neglected compared 
with more ‘upstream’ interventions. Taking a 
pragmatic view that, despite the best efforts of police 
and security services, not all future plots will be 
prevented, developing an understanding of how any 
harms can be mitigated is an important undertaking. 
Terrorist violence is purposively designed to ‘terrorise, 
polarise and mobilise’, different public audiences, 
therefore understanding and managing the dynamics 
of public reaction to these provocations is vital.
A defining premise of research on terrorism is that 
generating media coverage of politically motivated 
violence is intrinsic to how and why it is conducted 
in particular ways. Consequently, there is a large 
and diverse literature on the interactions between 
terrorism and media. Of particular salience to the 
current study is a relatively recent shift in approach 
towards more detailed ‘event based’ analyses. 
Rather than general commentaries on how media 
cover terrorism, these provide more ‘high resolution’ 
and intricate renderings of the ways communicative 
actions influence the trajectories of specific cases.
This shift reflects how the presence of social media 
affords new forms of data capture that can be 
used to study terror  events in ways that were not 
previously possible. Studies adopting this approach 
are especially relevant to the focus of this research.
Positioned in this way, research on the interactions 
between media and terrorism are interpreted as 
gravitating around four key ‘logics’. By ‘logic’ we mean 
the principles and ‘drivers’ that serve to organize 
and structure an understanding of the causes and 
consequences of mediated communication on the 
conduct of terrorism by different actors. 
 Terror logics focus upon how and why individuals 
or groups seek to harness, utilize or exploit different 
forms of mediated communication in pursuing their 
intentions or aims.
 Media logics are concerned with illuminating 
the rationales involved in how journalists, the 
organisations to which they belong, or social media 
users, report and interpret terror events.
 Response logics  attend to the activities of 
counter-terrorism, and how mainstream media and 
social media channels function to frame  the ways 
acts of terror are responded to.
 Harm logics document the social impacts and 
consequences induced by how the media, of different 
types, portray terror events and the reactions to 
these.
Typically, individual research studies tend to accent 
one or other of these ‘logics’, but in reality these 
dimensions interact with each other to shape the 
overall mechanics and dynamics of reaction to a 
particular terror event . 
To help make the findings distilled from our analysis 
of the literature more practically useful and 
insightful, we have established two vectors via which 
they can be disaggregated. The first of these focuses 
upon the communications performed by different 
actors connected to an event, using mainstream 
or social media. The second attends to issues of 
temporal sequencing, in terms of how communicative 
interventions are positioned at particular moments 
in time after the violent event.
MEDIA & TERRORISM
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SIX KEY GROUPS OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTORS 
ARE IDENTIFIED. THESE ARE:
Perpetrators The instigator(s) of a terror event 
physically at the scene, and their supporters. 
Typically, they are seeking to amplify the impact, and 
/or set out justifications or explanations for it.
Participants People physically present at the scene 
as the terror event occurs in real time (including 
victims, eye-witnesses, bystanders, journalists).
Public The audience(s) to terror reached by media and 
responding to media; reading, listening, viewing and 
reacting online and offline. Audience membership 
can often be segmented in terms of their interest in 
and alignment with the event.
The main report details how, as time passes in the wake of an event, these messengers and their messages 
become more or less influential on the overarching dynamics of wider social reaction. To help understand this 
aspect, the process is sub-divided into a number of key temporal phases as depicted in the Figure below.
Practitioners The state actors who orchestrate the 
operational response to the terror event in live time 
(includes police, security services and government 
officials).
Press and Publicisers The print and broadcast mass 
media reporting on the event. Extends to media 
personalities or ‘talking heads’ without explicit 
affiliation to a political party, communicating via 
blogs, Op-Eds or social media.
Policy and Politics This label seeks to capture the 
influence of policy makers and other politicians, 
of varying ideological persuasions, whose 
communicative interventions help shape reactions 
to the event. 
Figure 1. From Minutes to Months: Key Temporal Phases of Social Reaction
KEY DEVELOPMENTS OVER TIME
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By blending communicative actors and time 
post-event,  it is possible to derive a structured 
understanding of ‘who is doing what and why’ in 
terms of media and social media communications 
conducted. Of course, the precise sequencing and 
timing will depend upon the specific circumstances 
of the incident itself, but as a framework this 
starts to identify the key generalisable patterns of 
communicative behavior.
The period immediately following the occurrence 
of terrorist violence is characterized by confusion 
and high degrees of uncertainty about what has 
happened. Initial public awareness is created by 
participants in the event tweeting messages, or using 
other social media platforms, to alert their followers. 
Such messages are picked up and rapidly relayed 
by other media outlets. In these circumstances, 
it is important for police to make an early public 
statement and then to update this when they can. 
This is preferable to delaying any comment, which 
will allow other voices to speculate, and spread 
misinformation and disinformation in the ensuing 
official information vacuum.
Discipline is vital because any inconsistencies and 
discrepancies will be exploited subsequently by the 
authors of conspiracy theories. Evidence suggests 
that uncorrected misinformation functions as a ‘seed’ 
for more deliberate disinformation propagation. 
Much as police investigators think in terms of a 
‘golden hour’ of criminal investigation where their 
initial actions exert a structuring influence over their 
subsequent activities, so it is appropriate to conceive 
of a ‘digital golden hour’ principle in this context. 
This holds that the early communications made by 
police, event participants and others, do a lot of work 
in framing subsequent public interpretations and 
understandings.
After the very early reactions have been registered, 
often by those directly connected to the event in 
some way, a more general public awareness and 
interest is likely to develop exponentially and very 
rapidly. In part, such dynamics are attributable to the 
engagement of a form of ‘affective contagion’, which 
leads onlookers to emotionally connect with, and 
become wrapped up in, the unfolding story.
During this period, one can expect supporters of the 
perpetrators to ‘claim’ the act, and for police and 
government responders to officially define it as a 
terrorist incident. This accompanies an explosion in 
public awareness and communications about the 
event, many of which include speculative ‘soft facts’. 
A key development to be monitoring at this stage is 
interventions by groups ideologically opposed to the 
suspected perpetrators, whose communications 
may start to try and amplify a sense of risk and incite 
anger.
Establishing a strategic communications capacity 
and capability during this period would  perform two 
functions: (1) provide timely and accurate updates 
about what is known at that time; (2) rapid rebuttals 
of any information that is known to be false. Typically, 
responses have focused upon the first of these, 
but evidence suggests that from a ‘harm reduction’ 
perspective, the latter is also increasingly vital.
One recent innovation observed and worth 
highlighting, is senior officials making proactive 
statements that try and anticipate trouble, and 
thereby influence the behaviour of key segments 
of the audience. In addition to any material effects 
this may have on hate crime, it can perform as an 
important signal to communities that there is an 
awareness of a potential vulnerability to experiencing 
negative repercussions.
As time passes, the initial sense of shock subsides 
and forms of public sense-making take over. Typically, 
this includes the development of a more detailed 
understanding of what has happened, who was 
involved and their motivations. During this period, 
it is common to observe inter-linked processes of 
solidarity and scapegoating. The former refers to 
public expressions of common values and how ‘our 
way of life’ is resilient to such assaults. More malign, 
is how certain social identities and groupings tend to 
be collectively blamed for the violence, by others with 
particular ideological affiliations. As a consequence, 
it is during this period that considerable policing 
effort may have to be directed towards managing 
‘secondary’ instances of violence including hate 
crimes against people and property symbolically 
associated with the social identities of those 
committing the original violence.
An important objective for post-event strategic 
communications during the sense-making period 
MINUTES
HOURS
DAYS
 8 Minutes to Months
is to not allow the perpetrators of the act, or their 
supporters, to craft a narrative that projects an 
aura of malignant power. Communications issued 
by politicians and policy-makers should avoid 
unintentionally contributing to an impression that 
the perpetrators of the act are ‘evil masterminds’. 
This important and legitimate objective can be 
achieved  by ensuring that discrediting information 
about the past behaviours of any suspects or groups 
are shared. 
In terms of countering narratives and perspectives 
authored by supporters of terrorist violence, civil 
society and third sector representatives can often 
provide an important voice in the days following an 
attack. There are opportunities for police and policy 
makers to think about how individuals in such roles 
might be helped to function as credible messengers. 
For example, police could brief such actors directly 
to make sure they are fully aware of the current 
situation.
A recently  documented development is the 
involvement of  foreign states running influence and 
interference campaigns, using a full spectrum of 
mass and social media assets, to inflame existing 
social tensions. At the current time, it is not clear 
how often such activities have been performed, but 
there is robust evidence of it having taken place on 
several occasions in the last two years. This blending 
of geopolitical conflicts into post attack situations 
establishes an additional layer of complexity to be 
managed by authorities, and may be an important 
arena for policy development in the near future.
After a few days, in most cases, intense public 
attention has passed.  Reflecting this, media interest 
and commentary often pivots around updates about 
the police investigation, and its progress.
In the weeks that follow, handling potentially 
‘discrediting’ information about the performance of 
the intelligence and security services may be an issue. 
One feature highlighted by the review of evidence 
about recent terror attacks is how, in the vast majority 
of cases, journalistic enquiries have revealed that 
terrorist offenders were previously ‘known’ to the 
authorities, and oftentimes had been in direct 
contact with them. Consequently, acknowledging 
and providing a reasonable explanation for what has 
transpired, is often a key strategic communications 
objective in the weeks after an attack.
Understanding how media and social media are 
used to communicate in the wake of terror attacks 
is important because of how past attacks are used 
to radicalize future potential perpetrators. This is 
not an activity restricted to the longer-term, and 
can sometimes commence quite soon after a terror 
event. However, we have positioned it at this point in 
the temporal sequencing, to reflect how an attack, 
and the responses to it, are  frequently enrolled into a 
wider narrative by members of the terrorist group.  It 
is this wider narrative that can subsequently be used 
to try and inspire and mobilise vulnerable others in 
the future.
A second facet of media interest at this point in time 
gravitates around the findings from any reviews 
or public inquiries that were launched to ‘learn 
the lessons’ from an  event, especially where they 
highlight  systemic weaknesses that are suspected 
to have contributed to the violence. As a general 
trend, as we move further away from the event in 
time, so a greater proportion of the media traffic 
can be defined as political communication. For 
example, whether legislative reforms are warranted 
is a common theme identified across terror events 
worldwide.
A key driver for the analysis overall, is to provide 
a comprehensive take on the range of interacting 
communications performed by different actors and 
stakeholders that take place during and after terror 
events, and how they collectively shape impacts and 
public understanding. The key findings and insights 
of the analysis can be summarized in a way that 
draws them together, providing a single point of view. 
This is depicted in the Figure below.
In due course, subject to suitable development, this 
framing has the potential to provide an organizing 
structure for a ‘playbook’ that can be used to steer 
policing and governmental strategic communications 
activities when responding to terror events.
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MINUTES
HOURS
DAYS
WEEKS
MONTHS
PERPETRATOR
Communicate live 
from scene, or co-opt 
others to do so.
PUBLIC
Register shock & horror 
on social networks.
Follow breaking news.
Uncertainty about what 
is happening.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Announce incident & attendance.
Channel public interest to social 
media channels.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Breaking news reports.
Remediate social media 
sources, especially images. 
Live blogs.
Contact eyewitnesses.
Vulnerable to spreading 
misinformation.
PARTICIPANTS
Real-time reporting. 
Rumour circulation.
PERPETRATOR
Supporters claim the act.
Ongoing perpetrator 
dialogue if event ongoing.
If ongoing, harness media 
coverage for situational 
awareness.
PUBLIC
Uncertainty continues.
Lots of soft facts communicated, 
esp. in information vacuum.
Early sense-making, connecting 
bits of information, to construct 
provisional narratives.
Hashtag campaigns initiate and 
continue for days.
POLICE & 
PRACTITIONERS
Confirm terror incident.
Establish media 
monitoring capability.
Communicate ‘hard 
facts’, don’t rebut ‘soft 
facts’, little ‘dialogue’.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Speculate suspect identity & motives.
Integrate affective content into news content. 
Algorithmic effects on influential voices & journalists co-opt hashtags.
Credible sources for official definitions of the situation.
‘Framing contests’, different groups compete to set the agenda. 
POLICY & POLITICS
“We will not live in fear” type 
statements.
Expressions of sympathy / concern.
Calls for resolute responses. 
Amplifying first responders 
communications.
PARTICIPANTS
Contact missing 
relatives/friends
PERPETRATOR
Use the event to try 
and radicalize others.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Updates on investigation.
Broadening role for community 
impact management.
Defend against reputational 
concerns. 
PERPETRATOR
Retrospective 
reporting (by others) 
interpreting their 
logics and actions.
PUBLIC
Public pressure to 
release information, or 
launch enquiry.
Anniversaries can 
reignite interest.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Criminal justice proceedings.
Learn from inquiries and/or reviews.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Report on any criminal trials and 
geo-political connections.
Report significant events, such as 
anniversaries, inquests, new laws.
POLICY & POLITICS
New legislation responding 
to identified weaknesses.
Establish review / enquiry.
PARTICIPANTS
Anniversaries and key events 
used to tell more detailed 
‘survivor stories’.
PERPETRATOR
Lambast ‘passive’ moderates.
Aftershocks – retaliatory attacks.
Online chatter amongst supporters
PUBLIC
Grieving and emotional sharing.
Resilience & solidarity actions (eg memorials).
Emergence of more critical voices. 
Polarised public opinion.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Official statements.
Identify suspects & appeal for info. to assist investigation. 
Enforcement actions against wider suspect networks (can 
continue for weeks and months).
Handle reputationally damaging info about ‘known suspects’.
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PARTICIPANTS
Victims identified. 
Feature in media stories, with 
human interest angle.
‘Hero and villain’ stories.
Testimonies on chaos at scene.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Identify concerns about 
police/intelligence services. 
Fill in the backstories of 
participants.
Broadcast public statements 
from a range of sources.
Report police operations.
Expose accounts. 
POLICY & POLITICS
Praise for emergency services, 
but this can ‘tip’ to critique.
‘Expert sources’ used by media.
Civil society groups make public 
statements and often mobilise.
Handle ‘known suspects’ type 
revelations.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Comments on investigation 
progress (or lack of).
Blame attribution (where 
appropriate).
Interpretations more in line with 
established political values.
Report a return to ‘normality’. PUBLIC
General public 
attention subsides.
Acute fear and anxiety 
triggered dilutes.
Resilience actions 
online and offline.
POLICY & POLITICS
Bi-partisan interpretations of the event.
Calls for review or enquiry.
Questions about wider counter-terrorism 
implications.
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Informed by the findings and insights generated from this assessment of the 
evidence, there are a series of actions and interventions that can be identified 
as good practice. Individually and cumulatively they can help  constrain media 
and social media communications seeking to amplify post-event harms 
associated with terrorism. These are summarised below:
1. In the minutes and hours following an attack, make an early statement about what is known and 
unknown at the current time and update this periodically. This is important in diminishing the 
space for rumours, propaganda and other ‘soft facts’.
2. Establish a strategic communications capacity and capability, to include a single authoritative 
messenger for public communications, and steer messaging through them. 
3. If the event  is ongoing, be prepared to ask citizens at the scene(s) to desist from using social 
media in case it is affording the perpetrators enhanced situational awareness.
4. Co-ordinate messaging across partner agencies to ensure consistency and complementarity.
5. Implement a social media listening capacity and capability early on, with a particular focus upon 
groups inciting anger and / or social tensions.
6. Utilize social media listening for rumours, fake news and conspiracy theories.  This should include 
foreign influence and interference operations. When these are detected, implement ‘rapid rebut-
tals’.
7. Message ‘polyphonically’ and proactively, recognizing that different platforms and channels en-
gage particular segments of the public.
8. As the immediate post-event reaction phase passes, prepare communications designed to ‘punc-
ture’ the glamour of any perpetrators. This could involve satire, or ‘boosting’ messages by commu-
nity-based opponents of the terrorist groups.
9. Set up a network of trusted journalist contacts and brief them regularly, including about known 
sources of disinformation. They can be helpful in exposing these to the wider public.
10. Be prepared to implement tactics that distract, disrupt, deny or delay messaging from other 
actors that might amplify the aggregate harm of the incident.
The overarching conclusion of the analysis is the importance of managing the post-event situation, in 
terms of influencing and minimising the public harm and impact resulting from a terror attack.  To date, 
we conclude that this has been under-appreciated and somewhat neglected when compared with the 
amount of attention and focus that has been directed to ‘upstream’ preventative interventions. There 
are opportunities to develop comprehensive policy frameworks for post-event prevention interventions 
designed to mitigate and moderate the harm impacts that any incident achieves. 
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CHAPTER 1.
Key Points
Introducing an event-based approach to reporting evidence and insights 
about the role of media and social media during and after terrorism 
events to understand:
• How communications can amplify the social harm of terror events and influence 
public perceptions of terrorism and counter-terrorism.
• The disruptive and transformative impacts of digital and social media.
• Generalisable patterns of social action and reaction associated with key communica-
tive actors as time passes during and after terrorism events.
• Needs and opportunities for the future management of terror risks.
Introduction
This document reports insights and evidence about the role of the mass media and social media 
during and after events of terrorism.   Conceptually, it takes an event-based approach, starting 
with a specific incident and then determining its causes and consequences over time.  By 
comparing across a number of events, it aims to progress a generalisable understanding of how 
and when mediated communications from key actors can be influential in amplifying the social 
harm associated with terrorism.  Developing such an enhanced understanding has particular 
value to policy and practice in terms of enabling more effective interventions to constrain the 
wider harms and impacts of terror events.
The organisation of the analysis gravitates around four key ‘logics’ or rationales that function to 
structure media communications about terror events. Applying these logics throughout allows 
our interpretation of events over time to attend to the following: i) perpetrators utilising the 
media to reach and engage a wide audience; ii) journalists sourcing and reporting in response 
to terror events; iii) the actions and reactions of policy and practice to terror events, and iv) the 
harm footprint left by terror, online and offline.
 16 Minutes to Months Minutes to Months 17
1.1 Scope
1 Nacos, B. (1994) Terrorism and the media: from the Iran hostage crisis to the World Trade Center bombing. Columbia University Press: NY.
2 Marthoz, JP (2017) Terrorism and the Media: a handbook for journalists. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002470/247074E.pdf
3 Pollitt, M. (1997) “A Cyberterrorism Fact or Fancy?”, Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference: 285-289.
4 https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/terrorism-2002-2005
5 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/here-s-why-you-should-worry-about-russian-propaganda
6 http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20141125_ISC_Woolwich_Report(website).pdf
7 Bartlett, J. and Miller, C. (2013) @metpolice uk: how twitter is changing modern policing. London. Demos.
The work is principally informed by a structured 
assessment of the published research literature. 
This is supplemented by a small number of empirical 
case studies drawn from high-profile terror events 
to highlight key contemporary developments and 
trends. 
The scope encompasses terror events worldwide with 
domestic and international motivations, enacted by 
a range of means and by any number of perpetrators. 
The nature and timing of an event itself structures, 
but does not determine, the reactions it generates 
and the trajectory of media communications about 
it.  Not all events have ‘media intent’,1 whilst others 
routinely slip under the media’s radar2.  This reflects 
how terrorism is a generic conceptual label covering 
a variety of forms of violence and circumstances that 
belies a straightforward consensus and definition. 
In terms of media attention and coverage. A hostage 
situation over an extended period presents different 
challenges from events where a single actor 
undertakes a suicide bombing or vehicle-based 
attack.
The scope does not include events defined as 
‘cyber-terrorism3’, nor ‘state-terrorism4’. However, 
the intervention and influence of online actors 
in the aftermath of real-world terror events are 
considered in terms of the propagation and spread 
of disinformation.5
1.2 Method
A Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) methodology 
was used to identify and interpret sources determined 
to be directly relevant to the scope of this work.   A 
REA provides a structured and robust account of 
the quantity and quality of evidence in respect of a 
given topic.  It is more rigorous and developed than 
an orthodox literature review, but less involved than 
a full systematic review.  A more detailed account 
of the procedures guiding the search, retrieval and 
analysis of source materials for this study is provided 
in the Appendix.
HOWEVER, TWO PRINCIPAL FINDINGS CAN BE 
SUMMARIZED HERE:
 Whilst the inter-relations between terrorism and 
mass media (and increasingly social media) have 
been extensively researched, detailed empirical 
studies of their role during and after specific events, 
as opposed to more general commentaries, are 
considerably less prevalent than what can be termed 
‘relational studies’ and ‘content-oriented studies’. 
The former is primarily concerned with the inter-
relations between media organizations, terror events 
and groups.  The latter offer detailed analyses of the 
contents propagated by media organizations about 
terror campaigns, attacks and groups, or by the 
terrorist organizations responsible.
 This notwithstanding, there does seem to be a 
trajectory of development where ‘event-based’ 
analyses are becoming more common-place, in 
part reflecting the streaming qualities and data 
capture affordances associated with new social 
media sources. Such empirical and event-based 
approaches to studying the interactions between 
media and terrorism are especially important for 
the current study and thus afforded particular 
prominence in what follows.
1.3 Introducing a time dynamic 
approach
Exemplifying the shift to event-based analyses, and 
subject to multiple relatively intensive investigations, 
is the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London in 
2013. Five significant studies of this incident have 
now been conducted, with each adopting a slightly 
different focus. These include the UK Parliament’s 
Intelligence and Security committee report,6 focused 
in particular upon the pre-crime activities of the two 
suspects, and their radicalisation. Relatively quickly 
after the crime, the think-tank Demos published a 
report7 incorporating twitter data collected following 
the murder, to argue that police needed enhanced 
capacity and capability to monitor and analyse social 
media platforms. Others have used social media 
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analytics to focus upon how terrorist attacks such as 
this occasion forms of digital cyber-hate.8 
The same event has been used to explore interactions 
between national press and social media, finding the 
former play an important role in steering and guiding 
the content of the latter in the aftermaths of atrocity 
events.9 In the context of the current report, this is 
especially salient as it contests the assumption 
that social media takes a leading, agenda-setting, 
function for press and broadcast outlets.  The 
empirical evidence suggests more complex patterns 
of recursive and mutually adjusting influences 
in terms of what gets communicated to public 
audiences, when and how. 
The most recent contribution to this literature 
gravitating around the Lee Rigby event is a pair of 
linked articles emanating from the same project. 
A systematic analysis collected social media 
data to delineate key patterns in the processes 
of social reaction in the wake of the attack10. 
Adopting a different conceptual lens, the event was 
interpreted using conflict dynamics theory to render 
a more sophisticated and complex understanding 
of relationships between key actors following 
terrorist violence.11 Rather than thinking in terms of 
‘perpetrators of an act’ versus ‘the authorities’ and 
‘general public’, the developing account was one of 
‘multi-polar interactive conflict dynamics’. The point 
made is that there are multiple and shifting contests 
over interpretation and meaning, engaging multiple 
with a range of actors and perspectives. According to 
this analysis, it is misleading to think of ‘the media’ 
as a singular entity cast in one role, rather different 
elements of the media ecology will perform different 
functions and offer different perspectives, which 
together shape aggregate social reaction patterns. 
From a detailed analysis of digital behavioural data, 
Innes et al.12  developed a conceptual model of the 
social organization of public reactions labelled ‘the 
10 “Rs” of social reaction’. These are summarized as 
follows:
8 Williams, ML. and Burnap, P. (2015) Cyberhate on social media in the aftermath of Woolwich: a case study in computational criminology and big data. British Journal of 
Criminology, 56, 2: 211-38.
9 McEnery, T., McGlashan, M., Love, R. (2015) Press and social media reaction to ideologically inspired murder: the case of Lee Rigby.  Discourse & Communication 2015, 
Vol. 9(2) 237–259
10 Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A.  and Rogers, D. (2016) “Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-vent” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence: 1–21, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1180289
11 Roberts, C., Innes, M., Preece, A., Rogers, D. (2018) After Woolwich: analysing open source communications to understand the interactive and multi polar dynamics of 
the arc of conflict. British Journal of Criminology, Volume 58, Issue 2: 434–54,
12 Innes, M., Roberts, C., Preece, A.  and Rogers, D. (2016) “Ten “Rs” of social reaction: Using social media to analyse the “post-vent” impacts of the murder of Lee Rigby,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence: 1–21, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1180289 
Reporting – involves people at the scene or in the 
vicinity detailing aspects of what they have observed 
or heard directly to a wider public audience; 
Requesting – as news breaks of a significant event, 
people seek to use their social networks to source 
more details about is happening or has happened; 
Responding – involves the use of social media 
platforms as a site for recording and sharing 
emotional and cognitive responses to what is often 
shocking and traumatizing news; 
Recruiting – as the process of reaction evolves and 
develops, extremist groups located at different points 
on the ideological spectrum seek to use social media 
platforms and their communications as vehicles to 
draw people towards their ideas and values; 
Retaliating – Facebook, Twitter and other platforms 
are now routinely involved, both directly and 
indirectly in the organization of retaliatory actions, 
which can be both physical and digital, as individuals 
and groups seek to vent their emotions; 
Risking – empirical observations across a number 
of terror incidents document how certain individuals 
seek to use media and social media to amplify a 
perception of risk in the wake of terror attacks, 
whilst others attempt to mitigate any such collective 
concerns and tensions; 
Rumouring – as a concept is used to cover the 
spreading of misinformation and disinformation 
which appears to be an intrinsic component of the 
post-attack situation; 
Remembering – although less fraught or divisive 
than some of the other Rs, remembering and the 
formatting of a collective memory of the incident and 
its key issues, is an important element of the process 
of reaction, especially over the longer-term; 
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Reheating – captures the ways in which ideologically 
motivated groups seek to connect the most recent 
attack, with other similar past incidents. The purpose 
being to wrap it into their broader grievance narrative; 
Resiliencing – recognizes that in addition to malign 
and harmful social impacts, terror attacks do also 
occasion more pro-social responses, such as surges 
in social solidarity.
Stepping back from the details of the particular 
analyses, collectively these studies of the Rigby 
murder point to two key vectors that can be used 
to aid the organisation of how we think about the 
aftermath of terrorist violence. The first of these is 
the role of time, and how reaction patterns unfold 
and evolve. The second vector concerns the different 
roles and functions that are performed by an array 
of actors, that together impact upon how an event 
comes to be publicly defined and understood. In 
approaching our analysis, we perceive an opportunity 
to blend aspects of these two positions together to 
craft a structured conceptual framework that will 
enable a systematic treatment of how media and 
social media perform a range of different roles during 
and after terrorist attacks.
1.4 The Minutes to Months (M2M) 
Framework
Informed by the studies detailed in 1.3 and the Rapid 
Evidence Assessment, a conceptual model was 
developed around the idea that there are a series 
of key temporal phases in the aftermath of a terror 
event.  The Minutes to Months (M2M) framework is 
used to structure the material presented herein.  A 
representation of the relations between the temporal 
phases is provided in Figure 1 on the following page.
This Minutes to Months framework offers an 
innovative approach to thinking about how events, 
and communications about them, can be understood 
as they unfold over time.  It posits that there are a 
series of five temporal phases in the aftermath of 
a terror incident: minutes, hours, days, weeks and 
months.  Approaching the media-terror relationship 
using this perspective means starting with the 
proximate consequences that occur immediately 
following an event and then tracing out how these 
frame further concatenated occurrences.    
As time advances from minutes to months, the more 
intense and concentrated initial impacts of an event 
tend to progressively dissipate, but the ripple effects 
can mean they touch greater numbers of the public 
and involve a wider array of communicative actors. 
These actors contribute to the media construction 
and reportage of incidents of terror over time, and 
ultimately to social reactions.
To some degree, the focus on particular actor roles 
within research studies on terrorism are structured 
by traditional academic disciplinary interests. For 
example, criminologists tend to highlight the role of 
police and other criminal justice agencies, whereas 
studies emanating from communication science 
tend to focus more upon journalists. The temporal 
framework adopted here illuminates ‘clusters’ of 
actors, acting and interacting at any one time point 
during or after an event.  From our reading of the 
empirical evidence, we identify six actor groups with 
respect to their media contribution: (1) Perpetrators; 
(2) Participants at the scene; (3) Public audiences; 
(4) Police and Practitioners; (5) Press and Publicisers 
and (6) Policy and Practice.  
In summary, combining an analysis of key actors and 
time periods helps bring together key communications 
and actions pertaining to ‘who is doing what and 
when’. Taking this perspective sheds new light on 
how media communications can influence public 
understandings, and reactions to, terrorism. The 
application of the same approach also highlights 
and identifies gaps in current knowledge, evidence 
and understanding.  Needs and opportunities for 
policy and practice development that will enhance 
the future management of terrorist risks and threats 
are therefore identified and discussed in sections 4 
and 5 of this report with an emphasis on practical 
interventions and further research.
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MINUTES
HOURS
DAYS
WEEKS
MONTHS
PERPETRATOR
Communicate live 
from scene, or co-opt 
others to do so.
PUBLIC
Register shock & horror 
on social networks.
Follow breaking news.
Uncertainty about what 
is happening.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Announce incident & attendance.
Channel public interest to social 
media channels.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Breaking news reports.
Remediate social media 
sources, especially images. 
Live blogs.
Contact eyewitnesses.
Vulnerable to spreading 
misinformation.
PARTICIPANTS
Real-time reporting. 
Rumour circulation.
PERPETRATOR
Supporters claim the act.
Ongoing perpetrator 
dialogue if event ongoing.
If ongoing, harness media 
coverage for situational 
awareness.
PUBLIC
Uncertainty continues.
Lots of soft facts communicated, 
esp. in information vacuum.
Early sense-making, connecting 
bits of information, to construct 
provisional narratives.
Hashtag campaigns initiate and 
continue for days.
POLICE & 
PRACTITIONERS
Confirm terror incident.
Establish media 
monitoring capability.
Communicate ‘hard 
facts’, don’t rebut ‘soft 
facts’, little ‘dialogue’.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Speculate suspect identity & motives.
Integrate affective content into news content. 
Algorithmic effects on influential voices & journalists co-opt hashtags.
Credible sources for official definitions of the situation.
‘Framing contests’, different groups compete to set the agenda. 
POLICY & POLITICS
“We will not live in fear” type 
statements.
Expressions of sympathy / concern.
Calls for resolute responses. 
Amplifying first responders 
communications.
PARTICIPANTS
Contact missing 
relatives/friends
PERPETRATOR
Use the event to try 
and radicalize others.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Updates on investigation.
Broadening role for community 
impact management.
Defend against reputational 
concerns. 
PERPETRATOR
Retrospective 
reporting (by others) 
interpreting their 
logics and actions.
PUBLIC
Public pressure to 
release information, or 
launch enquiry.
Anniversaries can 
reignite interest.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Criminal justice proceedings.
Learn from inquiries and/or reviews.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Report on any criminal trials and 
geo-political connections.
Report significant events, such as 
anniversaries, inquests, new laws.
POLICY & POLITICS
New legislation responding 
to identified weaknesses.
Establish review / enquiry.
PARTICIPANTS
Anniversaries and key events 
used to tell more detailed 
‘survivor stories’.
PERPETRATOR
Lambast ‘passive’ moderates.
Aftershocks – retaliatory attacks.
Online chatter amongst supporters
PUBLIC
Grieving and emotional sharing.
Resilience & solidarity actions (eg memorials).
Emergence of more critical voices. 
Polarised public opinion.
POLICE & PRACTITIONERS
Official statements.
Identify suspects & appeal for info. to assist investigation. 
Enforcement actions against wider suspect networks (can 
continue for weeks and months).
Handle reputationally damaging info about ‘known suspects’.
Minutes to Months 
Map of Reactions To Terror Events
Figure 2.
PARTICIPANTS
Victims identified. 
Feature in media stories, with 
human interest angle.
‘Hero and villain’ stories.
Testimonies on chaos at scene.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Identify concerns about 
police/intelligence services. 
Fill in the backstories of 
participants.
Broadcast public statements 
from a range of sources.
Report police operations.
Expose accounts. 
POLICY & POLITICS
Praise for emergency services, 
but this can ‘tip’ to critique.
‘Expert sources’ used by media.
Civil society groups make public 
statements and often mobilise.
Handle ‘known suspects’ type 
revelations.
PRESS & PUBLICISERS
Comments on investigation 
progress (or lack of).
Blame attribution (where 
appropriate).
Interpretations more in line with 
established political values.
Report a return to ‘normality’. PUBLIC
General public 
attention subsides.
Acute fear and anxiety 
triggered dilutes.
Resilience actions 
online and offline.
POLICY & POLITICS
Bi-partisan interpretations of the event.
Calls for review or enquiry.
Questions about wider counter-terrorism 
implications.
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CHAPTER 2.
Key Points
Setting the Scene with an overview of 4 ‘Logics of Media and Terrorism’ 
connecting events, communication and actors.
This section provides an overview of key themes related to the connections between media and 
terrorism.  It is organised around four principles or ‘logics’, which each represent ‘gravitational’ 
positions within the research literature around which recurrent themes and interests appear to 
coalesce.  These are identified as:
BOX 1
Logics underpinning the current literature 
on media and terrorism.
How the perpetrators of terrorism use participants 
at the scene and the media as a conduit to public 
audiences.
How press and publicisers communicate via traditional 
and social media networks, and the impact they have on 
the unfolding definition of the situation.
How police and practitioners and actors associated with 
policy and politics respond to the event in the short and 
longer-term and influence public opinion.
The near term and longer-term ‘footprints’ terror leaves 
within communities online and offline that signals 
harmful public impacts.
TERROR 
LOGICS:  
MEDIA 
LOGICS:  
RESPONSE 
LOGICS:  
HARM 
LOGICS:  
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Prefacing a more detailed discussion, it is worth 
noting that many of the problems and challenges 
identified in respect of media and social media 
reporting of terror events replicate and reproduce 
issues identified across a wider range of social 
institutions and situations. The disruptive and 
transformative effects of social media upon the media 
ecology are not confined to terrorism phenomena but 
are more structural and deep-rooted. Recognition of 
this is relevant to thinking about possible policy and 
practice innovations insofar as effective responses 
may require forms of social engineering beyond 
the purview of even the most determined counter-
terrorism agency.
It is relevant to this analysis that, at the time of 
writing, the roles and responsibilities of social media 
companies appear to be undergoing a degree of re-
negotiation. For a considerable period their avowed 
position has been that they are not ‘publishers’ of 
the material that appears on their platforms and 
should not be viewed as responsible for the content 
of what their users post online. However, following a 
number of public scandals and adverse publicity, it 
does appear that a number of the main social media 
providers are becoming more interventionist in terms 
of:
 Identifying content on their platforms that should 
be removed, and in some cases stopping such 
material  being uploaded in the first place;
 Doing more to amplify influential and credible 
information sources; and,
 Tracking event-related propaganda for extended 
periods following significant events.
The issues here are complex and beyond the purview 
of this report. There are important questions of rights 
to free speech that have to be considered in terms of 
any regulatory intervention and what people can say 
within the boundaries of law. Equally, such rights have 
to be counter-balanced by recognition that collective 
harm can be generated by toxic communications 
following significant acts of politically motivated 
violence. These complexities notwithstanding, it is 
certainly the case that actions by platform providers 
13 Paul Wilkinson, “The Media and Terrorism: A Reassessment” Terrorism and Political Violence 9 (1997): 51–64, doi: 10.1080/09546559708427402
14 Martin Innes, Signal Crimes: Social Reactions to Crime, Disorder and Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); See also L. Dillon, Joshua D. Freilich & S.M. Cher-
mak. 2018. Media effects within the context of violent extremism in the post 9/11 era. In M. Khader, N.L. Seng, J. Tan & D. Cheong. Eds. Learning From Violent Extremist 
Attacks: Insights from Behavioral Sciences Perspective. Hackensack: World Scientific. In press.
15 Steven M. Chermak and Jeffrey Gruenewald, “The Media’s Coverage of Domestic Terrorism,” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2006): 428 – 461. DOI: 
10.1080/07418820600985305 
16 Wilkinson, “The media and terrorism”, 51-64.
can have an important role in constraining the public 
harms induced in the wake of terror attacks.
Relatedly, it would be misleading to assume that 
all the problems recently attributed to mass media 
and social media reporting of terror events are 
without precedent.  Whilst social media technologies 
and platforms have unleashed new social and 
communication dynamics, there are also some 
deeper challenges that relate to how journalists 
commentate on terrorist violence in general. There 
have been long-standing concerns that media 
coverage of counter-terror interventions might offer 
a tactical advantage to those engaging in violence. 
This was an issue discussed with respect to the 
SAS’s iconic storming of the London Iranian Embassy 
in 198013.  Recent debates about the use of social 
media to engage in ‘live reporting’ from the scene 
of the attack can be understood as resonating with 
these longer-term concerns. 
2.1 Terror Logics
Terrorist violence is a form of communicative action 
designed to ‘terrorize, polarize and mobilize’ different 
segments of the public audience.14 Consequently, 
there is a long-standing and widespread recognition 
of the importance of the relationship between 
media and terrorism. For a number of prominent 
commentators, capturing public attention in the wake 
of an event is at least as important as any destruction 
in understanding the logics and rationales of those 
engaging in political violence.15 Summarizing the 
literature in this vein, Paul Wilkinson identified that 
mass media provide four key potential affordances 
for terrorist organizations:16
1. Conveying propaganda of the deed and generating 
fear among target groups;
2. Mobilizing wider support for their cause amongst 
the general population;
3. Frustrating and disrupting the response of the 
government and security services;
Fostering enhanced and more material support from 
those already sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause.
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An analysis of the 17-day hijacking of TWA Flight 847 
suggests that extensive coverage by NBC Television 
and the other networks enhanced the ‘value’ of the 39 
hostages to the Shi’ite Islamic Jihad terrorist group 
who had seized them.  As a result, it significantly 
increased the pressure on American and Israeli 
governments to secure their release.17 
A number of studies have sought to develop 
theoretical accounts that centre the performative 
aspects of terror18. This perspective interprets 
terrorism as being as much about capturing political 
and public attention, as it is about causing harm and 
destruction. The key ingredient is the desire of those 
committing the attack to generate media coverage, 
an intent integrated into the design and delivery of 
their violence. This would include instances where 
terrorists record their violence, either sending 
it to journalists for onward dissemination, or 
broadcasting it directly to a public audience via the 
internet. A variant of this logic was Anders Breivik, 
who in anticipation of his spree of deadly violence, 
made arrangements for public distribution of his 
‘manifesto’.
As well as these more expressive and performative 
functions, a number of studies document how 
media and social media can be deployed more 
instrumentally in a terror attack by perpetrators 
and their sympathisers19. For example, after the 
Mumbai terror attack in 2007, it was revealed that the 
marauding machine-gun operatives on the ground 
were being provided with situational awareness by 
supporters overseas, monitoring social media and 
using it to update their colleagues about what was 
happening in near real-time20.  
2.2 Media Logics
In his analyses of how and why media organizations 
report crime and crisis events in particular ways, 
David Altheide21 distilled a set of  ‘media logics’ to 
account for how journalists and media proprietors 
reconcile commercial imperatives with key practices. 
17 A. P. Schmid, “Terrorism and the media: The ethics of publicity,” Terrorism and Political Violence 1, no. 4 (1989): 539–65, doi: 10.1080/09546558908427042.
18 Weimann, G. (2008) The Theater of terror. Psychology of terrorism and mass media, 379-90. Kellner, D. (2004) 9/11, spectacle of terror and media manipulation. Critical 
Discourse Studies, 1: 1: 41-64.   Chouliariaki, L and Kissas, A (2018) The communication of horrorism: a typology of online death videos. Critical Studies in Media Commu-
nication, 35, 1
19 Sullivan, R. (2014) Live-tweeting terror: a rhetorical analysis of @HSMPress_ twitter updates during the 2013 Nairobi hostage crisis. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7, 
3: 422-33.
20 Oh, O. et al. (2011) Information control and terrorism: tracking the Mumbai terrorist attack through twitter. Inf Syst Fron, 13: 33-43.
21 David L. Altheide, “The Mass Media, Crime and Terrorism,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 5 (2006): 982–997, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mql061
22 Dillon, L., Freihlich, D. and Chermak, SM. (forthcoming) “Media effects”, in press. 
23 Miller, J and Sack, C (2010) “Terrorism and anonymous sources: The Toronto 18 case,” Canadian Journal of Media Studies 8 (2010): 1-21.
24 Fahmy, S. (2017) Media, Terrorism and society: perspectives and trends in the digital age. Special Issue Mass Communications and Society, 20: 35-9.
Understanding these logics helps to explain and 
justify the ways in which journalists and mass media 
organizations act, in terms of covering some events 
but not others, and how these get constructed as 
stories. Importantly, there is a general consensus 
that structural changes to the media ecology in 
terms of financial pressures are altering some of 
the operating principles steering traditional media 
organizations. 
There is recurring concern about how the media 
report terror events in ways that can shape how it 
unfolds, with the effect of increasing the intensity 
and reach of an event’s impact.22 This raises 
obvious and important questions.  What is known 
about the impacts and effects of these patterns 
of communication? How do they influence public 
understandings of terrorism and counter-terrorism 
with regard to specific incidents and more generally?
An orienting principle of media effects research is 
trying to understand the specifics of how much and 
what kinds of influence different forms of media 
reportage have. Whilst media may have only limited 
impacts upon what people think, they are more 
profoundly influential in determining the issues we 
think about. Miller and Sack23, for example, report: 
“there is no doubt the Toronto 18 case, and the way 
the media covered it, contributed to a heightened 
state of public alarm about terrorism and Muslims”. 
In support of this contention, the authors cite a 
CanWest News Service poll, immediately after the 
arrests of the Toronto 18, that suggested a majority 
of Canadians (58%) believed there were many more 
extremist groups and cells operating in Canada. 
This ‘agenda-setting’ function achieved by press 
and publicisers through filtering events, issues and 
problems for collective attention, whilst deselecting 
others, is a critical way in which media are important 
in social life. To some degree, this effect has been 
weakened by the prevalence of social media, 
which undoubtedly occasion opportunities for a 
greater diversity of interests, sources of news and 
perspectives24. However, we should not over-state 
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this diversification on the grounds that, when major 
terror attacks occur, people flock to both mainstream 
and social media seeking information about what 
has transpired.
The capacity of a terror event to capture and sustain 
media and public attention is in part a function of the 
damage and destruction it delivers. Extraordinary 
forms of violence, such as that executed on 9/11, or in 
London in 2005, are almost inevitably and inherently 
more newsworthy than incidents where the harm is 
less visible. Indeed, these kinds of media logics feed 
in to terror logics to explain how and why terrorists 
seek to change and innovate their tactics. One reason 
for their macabre innovations in violence, their choice 
of symbolic targets or dates, may be an awareness 
that such qualities render it more ‘newsworthy’ and 
likely to acquire attention. 
There is a general pattern then that terror events 
attract media attention, and many are conducted in 
ways intended to leverage such publicity. But it would 
be misleading to suggest that all attacks incorporate 
a media logic.  There are qualities that tend to 
lessen the intensity of media interest. For example, 
where the intent or motivations behind an attack 
are not especially clear. Whilst this can elicit media 
speculation and commentary, overall it tends to 
weaken the ability of journalists and commentators 
to frame a strong narrative about the violence and its 
causes.
2.3 Response Logics
If media logics identify the imperatives structuring 
and steering the behaviours of social media users, 
journalists and press and broadcast organizations 
to which they belong, response logics are their 
equivalent for a range of actors associated police 
and practitioners (e.g. other emergency responders), 
policy and politics. 
Ultimately, communications from these sources have 
value in shaping the level and intensity of the harm 
that an event acquires in the short and longer-term. 
For example, in the early aftermath of a terror event, 
‘official’ communications from these sources in the 
media are likely to be restricted to merely confirming 
an incident has taken place and perhaps reminding 
the public at large that there may be other actors who 
25 Rutten, B (2015) The response that was #BostonStrong: insights from the 2013 Boston marathon bombings.  Conference Board of Canada.
26 Innes, M. (2014) Signal Crimes: social reaction to crime, disorder and control.  Oxford University Press: pp 71-72.
are actively spreading ‘soft facts’ about that event, 
albeit deliberately (disinformation) or unwittingly 
(misinformation).  
Learnings about timely and appropriate response 
continues to evolve from experience over time. 
For example, after the 2013 terrorist attack at the 
Boston marathon, researchers from the Conference 
Board of Canada25 undertook a fact-finding mission 
there, aimed at drawing lessons on critical situation 
management.  One of the key findings to emerge 
was the importance of social media broadcasting 
‘real-time’ information to the community. As the 
report’s author observed, “in a crisis, people use 
social networks for a variety of informational 
purposes, including to: gather information about 
the crisis, family, and friends; reach out for help; 
share information with authorities; inform and offer 
assistance to others [and] provide emotional support 
to each other” (ibid.: 31). In relation to events in 
Boston, individuals spoke of the potential for social 
media tools supporting three critical objectives: 
“disseminating and amplifying official event-related 
information and advice to build the public’s support 
and guide their behaviour; monitoring social media 
to help build timely organizational situational 
awareness [and] detecting and addressing event-
related (mis-)information” (ibid.: 31). City officials 
also recognized, post hoc, they had been hampered 
in their information sharing efforts by the lack of an 
emergency broadcast message (ibid.). 
2.4 Harm Logics
Harm logics foreground concern with more malign 
effects or outcomes that are associated with the 
media coverage of events.  High profile terror attacks 
have the capacity to induce a range of impacts and 
consequences which can be variously experienced 
at individual, community / group and social levels. 
These are configured by Innes (2014) as ‘private’, 
‘parochial’ and ‘public’ ‘harm footprints’26. These 
categories differentiate between events where the 
intensity, prevalence and distribution of any effects 
is limited and constrained, and events where harms 
and impacts ‘travel’ to ‘touch’ far greater numbers of 
people. 
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Opinion surveys show that the public salience of 
terrorist attacks varies over time and is not a simple 
function of the frequency or intensity of attacks.27 
There is a suggestion in Spanish survey data that 
the public can become somewhat desensitized to 
terror in the midst of a long-term campaign, but also 
that the tenor and tone of political reactions to the 
violence can have a role in amplifying the social harm 
people experience. That this is Spanish evidence, 
between 1985 and 2012, is pertinent given the 
consensus that the Madrid attacks in 2004 played a 
role in shaping the outcome of the general election of 
that year.28  Analyses of the impacts of the November 
2015 terror attack in Paris found that post-event 
fear and ‘cyberhate’ travelled across nations in its 
aftermath, with increases detected in Spain, Finland, 
Norway and the United States, as well as France29. 
Consistent with the findings of other studies, the 
data suggested that harmful effects of cyberhate are 
mitigated by social trust30. 
27 Hénar O. Criado, (2017) “What makes terrorism salient? Terrorist strategies, political competition and public opinion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 29, no. 2: 197-214, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1008628 
28 Oksanen, A., Kaakinen, M.,  Minkkinen, J.,  Räsänen, P., Enjolras,  B. and Steen-Johnsen,, K. (2018) “Perceived societal fear and cyberhate after the November 2015 Paris 
terrorist attacks,” Terrorism and Political violence (2018):1–20, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1442329.
29 Oksanen et al.(2018) Perceived societal fear and cyberhate after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. Terrorism and Political violence (2018):1–20. doi: 
10.1080/09546553.2018.1442329.
30  Williams, ML and Burnap, P (2016) “Cyberhate on social media in the aftermath of Woolwich: A case study in computational criminology and big data,” British Journal 
of Criminology 56, no. 2 (2016): 1–28. doi: 10.1093/bjc/azv059
Whilst these four logics are presented separately 
above, it is not intended that each are viewed in 
isolation from each other.   As will be accented by the 
range of studies reviewed in this document, logics co-
exist and interact with each other in the time during 
and after terror events. A symbiotic relationship 
between terror and media is widely recognised but, 
also emergent when the communications associated 
with an event are analysed over time, are other key 
interactions in the contemporary communication 
environment. For example, the interaction between 
media and response logics in the early time frames 
of an event as it unfolds.  
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CHAPTER 3.
Key Points
An evidence-based conceptual framework is introduced to model 
key temporal phases in the aftermath of a terror event. It traces 
how initial impacts progressively dissipate over time to reach a 
greater number of communicative actors and public audiences.
• Events: the circumstances of an incident, in terms of whether the attack is 
concluded or ongoing, shape and influence the temporal dynamics of media 
coverage.
• Minutes: actions and behaviours performed by communicative actors immedi-
ately following an event when levels of confusion and uncertainty are high. 
• Hours: an ‘information explosion’ in public awareness of the event via media 
and social media. Official notification of the event co-exists with rumour and 
other ‘soft facts’.
• Days: the emergence of ‘collective sense-making’ and a public definition of the 
situation. A surge in solidarity may be off-set to some degree by rising social 
tension. 
• Weeks: more reflective and critical reactions to the event are reported, along 
with developments or outcomes in the police investigation.
• Months: The agenda-setting role of the media leads to the specifics of the 
event being absorbed into a wider narrative on terrorism and extremism. This 
can include political dimensions of response, public inquiries and new legis-
lation, but also radicalising influences that may feed in to subsequent terror 
plots.
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The situated details associated with 
a defined critical event, structure and 
guide, but do not determine, the type 
and strength of reaction it generates. 
The capacity of a terror event to capture media and 
public attention is, in part, a function of the damage 
and destruction it delivers. Extraordinary forms of 
violence committed against symbolic targets, such 
as that executed on 9/11 or in London in 2005, are 
almost inevitably and inherently more newsworthy 
than incidents where the harm is less visible, or its 
impacts judged less resonant to audiences in more 
powerful countries. Some events are orchestrated to 
‘explode’ into newsfeeds, whilst others progressively 
unfold in a nail biting drama. The latter building 
in intensity and in terms of their ability to capture 
public attention over a period of hours or days.  An 
event over an extended period is thus very different 
in terms of the communication challenges it raises 
from other types of event, which begin and end 
instantaneously.
It is not unusual for a breaking news event to be 
labelled as ‘terrorism’ prior to any official definition 
of the situation being issued. In such circumstances, 
these early proclamations can have a framing 
influence upon initial reporting as more details about 
it enter the public domain. This is pertinent to the 
subsequent discussion of key time periods, in that, 
where a terror event is spread over days (such as in a 
hostage-taking or siege), then this can mean some of 
the key communication-based reactions are delayed 
in terms of when they happen, compared with their 
occurrence following more temporally condensed 
forms of violence. As such, in what follows, we have 
assigned key communicative actions to particular 
temporal phases. This is on the basis that these are 
the points of time when these things are most likely 
to happen. However, this does not imply that these 
are the only moments when they can occur during 
or after a terror attack, as this can reflect the nature 
of the incident itself.   After all, what we are seeking 
to elucidate through this analysis are reaction 
patterns, rather than documenting every possibility 
or eventuality.
Considerable space could be directed herein to 
discussing the details of different modalities of 
terrorist violence and their respective abilities to 
leverage varying volumes of media and social media 
coverage. However, for our purposes, it is sufficient 
to acknowledge that whilst there are some common 
patterns and tendencies in terms of the social 
organization of reactions to terror events through 
different media, there are differences also: the 
nature of the terror event itself is one factor, but not 
the only one.   
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The period immediately following the 
instigation of an event is always marked 
by a high degree of uncertainty about 
what has occurred. There will typically 
be multiple, conflicting accounts and interpretations 
of what has happened and why. People who witness, 
record and react at the scene, are often the first 
to ‘break the news’ to a public audience, acting as 
‘citizen journalists’ potentially capturing real-time 
imagery and commentary of the event in progress. 
Individual or group perpetrators of an event may 
well upload material or communicate online or try 
to do so through mainstream media. Typically, these 
early communications are either of the violence 
they are performing, or provide a justification for, or 
explanation of, their motives. Press and publicisers 
will, in the minutes following an attack, start to 
cover it, often in a fairly descriptive register, with 
speculations about possible causes and/or motives 
being progressively introduced.  As awareness that 
a significant event has taken place starts to spread, 
a public audience starts to assemble, frequently 
turning to their social networks as they ‘forage’ for 
information about it.  Coherent with this, rumours 
will frequently start to circulate, some of which will 
be substantiated, and others disproved. This is a 
31 Maura Conway and Joseph Dillon, “Case Study: Future Trends – Live-streaming Terrorist Attack?” Vox-Pol (2016): 1-8.
32 David Mair, “#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 1 (2017): 24-43, doi: 
10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157404
33 “Woolwich attack: the terrorist’s rant,” The Telegraph, May 32, 2013, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10075488/Woolwich-at-
tack-the-terrorists-rant.html   Jamie Grierson, “Lee Rigby murder: Killer Michael Adebolajo handed witness a note attempting to justify actions,” The Independent, 
December 19, 2013, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/lee-rigby-murder-killer-michael-adebolajo-handed-witness-a-note-attempting-to-justify-ac-
tions-9015775.html
symptom of the speed at which key communicative 
actors engage with a breaking story and this is a time 
when a number of significant actions occur. From 
a policy and practice perspective, these very early 
stages are notoriously difficult in communication 
terms as it is unclear what exactly has happened. 
Consequently, at this stage, official mediated 
communications tend to be restricted to notifying 
/ confirming that a major event has occurred or is 
occurring. 
Terror Logics
Attending first to the logics of terror, perpetrators 
can seek to amplify the impact of their actions 
by attracting media coverage, or live and direct 
messaging through social media platforms. 
Multiple instances of ‘live streaming’ by individual 
perpetrators of terror to broadcast and justify their 
actions have been documented31. For example, the 
2013 Westgate mall siege in Kenya involved the 
assailants live-tweeting from its onset.32  Following 
the murder of Lee Rigby, the perpetrators remained 
at the scene to actively co-opt eyewitnesses to 
video their message and pass on a handwritten note 
justifying their actions.33  In the Sydney Siege (also 
known as the Martin Place Siege or the Lindt Café 
MINUTES
3.2
 32 Minutes to Months
Siege), the assailant, Man Haron Monis, monitored 
traditional media, compelling his hostages to reach 
out to media outlets and make social media posts 
and videos on his behalf.34 The two-day incident 
received rolling news coverage across Australia, with 
the beginning of the incident captured on ‘live to air’ 
morning television programming, with the siege site 
located directly opposite the television studios of the 
Channel 7 network.
Perpetrator communications typically have 
multiple target audiences, including their perceived 
adversaries and the general public. Intriguingly 
though, there is evidence that they also routinely seek 
to speak to groups with ideological affinities to their 
position, as they seek to recruit sympathisers to their 
brand of extremism.  These intra-group competitive 
behaviours have been documented amongst far-
right groups35 and Islamist jihadi groups.36 
Given the predilection of terrorist actors and 
organizations to want to control and edit their 
narrative, a number pre-prepare material (such as 
videos and manifestos) broadcasting their intention, 
justifying their actions or worldview before, during 
or shortly after they act.   Perpetrators can also 
seek to stage events in front of a large, pre-existing 
media presence in order to guarantee immediate 
live coverage.  Examples include the 1972 Munich 
Olympics,37 the second plane hitting the World Trade 
Centre (one of the most watched live TV events in 
history) and the Boston marathon bombing.   In the 
Boston example, the news broke via the Boston Globe 
newspaper’s twitter only 8 minutes after the bomb 
detonated at the finish line where journalists were 
already present. Live TV coverage was established 
within half an hour, preceding the first official 
statement by police by some twenty minutes.38
Media Logics
With the proliferation of 24/7 media channels and 
digital participatory platforms, Press and Publicisers 
34 Michael Barnes, Inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege: Findings and Recommendations (Sidney, New South Wales:  State Coroner of New South 
Wales, 2017). 
35 Joshua D. Freilich, Steven M. Chermak, and David Caspi, “Critical Events in the Life Trajectories of Domestic Extremist White Supremacist Groups: A case study analysis 
of four violent organizations,” Criminology & Public Policy (2009): 497-530.
36 Edna Erez, Gabriel Weimann, and Aaaron Weisburd, “Jihad, Crime, and the Internet: Content Analysis of Jihadist Forum Discussions,” Report submitted to The National 
Institute of Justice (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/236867.pdf
37 Find Bennett 2016 ref
38 Mary Kate Brogan, “How Twitter is Changing Narrative Storytelling: A Case Study of the Boston Marathon Bombings,” The Elon Journal of Undergraduate Research in 
Communications 6, n. 1 (2015): 28–47.
39 http://upsi.org.uk/news/2018/4/23/briefing-paper-digital-influence-engineering
40 https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-russian-trolls-on-reddit-251075642811
41 https://disinfoportal.org/botspot-twelve-ways-to-spot-a-bot/
42 Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
43 Gilardi, F. (2016). Digital Democracy. How Digital Democracy is Changing Democracy and its Study. 1-5.
44 Mareile Kaufmann, “Resilience 2.0: social media use and (self-)care during the 2011 Norway attacks,” Media, Culture & Society 37, no. 7 (2015):972-987, doi: 
10.1177/0163443715584101
are increasingly quick to frame a ‘media event’ after 
its occurrence and reach a worldwide audience. This 
initial framing often takes place ahead of any official 
definition of the situation as involving terrorism.  As 
a consequence, reporting during the first minutes 
tends to be quite confused. There may well be 
multiple competing accounts of what has happened, 
who is involved and why. Unsurprisingly therefore, 
different media platforms and channels can offer 
markedly different accounts during this period, and 
there can be substantive revisions to these as events 
and official accounts unfold. As part of this general 
uncertainty and confusion, a lot of rumours and ‘soft 
facts’39 (unvalidated and unverified information) will 
be circulating in mass media and social media.  Post 
the 2016 US elections, social media platforms and 
analysts have increasingly picked up on the malign 
activities of ‘troll farms’40 sowing seeds of political 
discord on the internet and of ‘bots’ – automated 
accounts posing as real people – distorting debate. 
Whilst many such accounts are ineffective, a few are 
prolific and in an unfolding crisis situation they can 
work together to amplify particular stories so that 
they trend on users’ social media newsfeeds41.
A number of studies suggest, that in the post 9/11 
era, the media have been too quick in framing and 
blaming Muslim perpetrators, often in advance of 
a clear understanding of events.   The significance 
of media framing in these initial stages has been 
characterised as: ‘the public respond not so much to 
events, but to reported events.’42  A second, related 
quality, concerns how the increasingly rapid, detailed 
and unfiltered communication of an event increases 
its emotional impact on public audiences.  Digital 
participatory platforms such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Instagram facilitate a greater communicative 
role and influence for citizens at the scene and 
networked citizens engaging with breaking news 
online43.
During the 2013 Oslo attack, some victims used 
social media to contact family and friends44, others 
to try and increase their situational awareness of 
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what was happening whilst they were isolated during 
the island shooting. However, survivors interviewed 
later felt that the high volume of information posted 
online at that time, including misinformation, was a 
difficulty, as were attempts made by journalists to 
contact them whilst they were still in hiding.45
The consequence is that mass media are no longer 
the primary gatekeepers in control of unfolding 
event narratives and visual images that circulate 
widely from the minutes after an event.46  Platforms 
such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube are often the 
source of breaking news, with the former described 
as switching from ‘ambient’ or background mode to 
central ‘foreground’ mode in immediate response, as 
reflected in trending topics.47   In this sense, social 
media have assumed an important agenda-setting 
role for mainstream media.48  This is supported by 
empirical analyses of crisis events (of which terror is 
one form), confirming that during, and immediately 
after, the consumption of news on social media by 
the public increases.  It is argued that, when highly 
uncertain events are in their infancy, the public 
45 Elisabeth Frey, “Do You Tweet When Your Friends Are Getting Shot? Victims’ Experience With, and Perspectives on, the Use of Social Media During a Terror Attack,” Social 
Media + Society (January 3, 2018): 1-11, doi: 10.1177/2056305117750715
46 Charlie Beckett, “Fanning the Flames: Reporting on Terror in a Networked World,” Columbia Journalism Review (2016), https://www.cjr. org/tow_center_reports/cover-
age_terrorism_social_media.php
47 Jean Burgess and Axel Bruns, “Twitter archives and the challenges of “Big Social Data” for media and communication research,” M/C Journal 15, no. 5 (2012): 1–7.
48 Tony McEnery, Mark McGlashan, and Rabbie Love, “Press and social media reaction to ideologically inspired murder: The case of Lee Rigby,” Discourse & Communication 
9, no. 2 (2015): 237–259. 
49 Yan Jin, Brooke Fisher Liu, and Lucinda L. Austin, “Examining the role of Social media in Effective Crisis Management: The Effects of Crisis Origin, Information Form, and 
Source on Publics,” Crisis Response, Communication Research 41, no. 1 (2014):74 – 94.
50 Jean-Paul Marthoz, Terrorism and the Media: A Handbook for Journalists (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2017).  
51 Anna Reading, “The London Bombing: Mobile Witnessing, Mortal Bodies and Globital Time,” Memory Studies 4, no. 3 (2011): 298–311, http://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/pdf/10.1177/1750698011402672 Stuart Allan, “Witnessing in Crisis: Photo-reportage of terror attacks in Boston and London,” Media, War & Conflict 7, no. 2 (2014): 
133–151 Maria Konow-Lund and Eva-Karin Olsson, “Social Media’s Challenge to Journalistic Norms and Values during a Terror Attack,” Digital Journalism 5, no. 9 (2017): 
1192–1204
52 Allan, “Witnessing in Crisis,” 133–151.
53 Wallen, N (2018) Police Professional.
may assign a higher level of credibility to social 
media coverage than to traditional media sources,49 
although the latter maintain a visible and influential 
online presence.50
Reflecting the dynamics between mass and social 
media, mainstream media organizations increasingly 
‘remediate’ reports and visual material originating 
from people at the scene in their early reportage.51 
In no small part, this is an inflection of mobile 
technologies affording increasingly high-quality 
image and video capture, enabling witnesses to film 
and upload events.  During the Woolwich murder of 
Lee Rigby in 2013, public participants at the scene 
were both filming and live-tweeting the incident.52 
Within forty minutes these individuals were being 
direct messaged by journalists from national outlets, 
who were offering to purchase the rights to their 
images.  Similarly, as British MP Jo Cox lay dying 
in the street having been attacked by a right-wing 
extremist, a member of the public filmed the scene.53 
Cassidy observes that, when terrorists succeed in 
carrying out their attacks, they do not need to film 
In a confused and uncertain early ‘confusion window’, multiple rumours typically start to circulate via both social 
media and mainstream media channels and can continue for a number of hours. It is important to stress that 
these are not just peripheral but can be vitally important and consequential. In the immediate wake of the Man-
chester Arena bombing in 2017, a rumour started on Facebook that gunmen were active at the local Oldham hos-
pital.   The timing of these posts altered the response to the situation for police officers on the ground, because it 
suggested that there were additional terrorists to the known suicide bomber. As a direct result, and in accordance 
with standard operating protocols, ambulance crews and fire service personnel were held at the outer cordon, 
delaying their move to the bomb scene to administer medical aid to the victims.   Whilst this decision has been 
subject to much retrospective criticism, more generally, evidence does suggest that rumours of additional attacks 
and attackers are commonplace in the minutes to hours after an event. However, the need to check and validate a 
social media rumour served to dilute first responses by police and partners in the Manchester case.
BOX 2
The impact of rumours circulating in the confusion 
window minutes after an event.
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the actions themselves – they can rely on the public 
to film and popularise their atrocities in almost 
real time. 54  What has been termed ‘connective 
witnessing’ represents a new way for networked 
public audiences to consume audio-visual material. 
55 
‘User-generated content’ (UGC) posted on the 
internet and social media is especially likely to be 
sourced by Press and Publicisers immediately after 
unexpected, unanticipated terror events56 when the 
media are in ‘emergency mode’.57   There is intense 
competition and pressure to be quick to a story, and 
in this context, the use and remediation of UGC has 
challenged the integrity of journalistic sourcing and 
verification processes. 
In a number of countries, online versions of 
mainstream media have adopted the practice of 
‘live blogging’ in the minutes after an event breaks, 
publishing a continuous stream of information in real 
time. This “fuzzy journalism” routinely incorporates 
reactions and commentary from a range of actors and 
functions to fill an ‘information vacuum’ in the early 
stages, arguably exacerbated by a general reluctance 
amongst policy and practice actors to say much at 
this time given their limited knowledge about what 
has actually occurred58.  For example, at-the-scene 
images circulating on Twitter within minutes of the 
Brussels bombing at Zaventem airport in 2016 were 
wrongly attributed to a journalist participant.59 In the 
UK, UGC influenced the early reporting of the 2017 
Manchester Arena bombing as a ‘balloon popping’ by 
the BBC on twitter. Likewise, in the minutes after the 
London Westminster attack of the same year, several 
sources broadcast that ‘explosions’ had been heard, 
even though it was a knife and vehicle-based event.60 
Early mis-reporting of this kind can prove influential in 
the propagation of conspiracy theories over the mid- 
to longer-term. It acquires traction in the immediate 
aftermath because there is a ‘need for news’ amongst 
the general public.   In sum, the contemporary media 
ecology constantly challenges journalists and 
editors to find the right balance between their ‘duty 
54 John Cassidy, “Terrorism in the Age of Twitter,” The New Yorker, November 23, 2015,  https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/terrorism-in-the-age-of-twitter 
55 Mette Mortensen, “Conflictual Media Events, Eyewitness Images, and the Boston Marathon Bombing (2013),” Journalism Practice 9, no. 4 (2015): 536-551, doi: 
10.1080/17512786.2015.1030140
56 Clair Wardle, Sam Dubberly, Peter D. Brown, Amateur footage: A global study of user-generated content in TV and online news output (New York, NY: Tow Center for 
Digital Journalism, Columbia University, 2014).
57 Marthoz, JP (2017) Terrorism and the Media: a handbook for journalists. UNESCO.
58 Bennett (2016)
59 Rauchfleisch et al. (2017) “How journalists verify user-generated content during terrorist crises. Analyzing Twitter communication during the Brussels attacks.” Social 
Media and Society (2017): 1–13.
60 CSRI CREST final report (forthcoming)
61 Rob Procter, Jeremy Crump, Susanne Karstedt, Alex Voss and Marta Cantijoch, “Reading the riots: what were the police doing on Twitter?” Policing and Society 23, no. 4 
(2013): 413–436, doi: 10.1080/10439463.2013.780223. 
to inform’ and journalistic integrity, in view of high 
volumes of unverified material that ultimately might 
glorify the perpetrators of terror and spread panic 
among the public.  
Response Logics
A key information and communication dynamic 
pertaining to the minutes after an attack is therefore 
members of the public participating in it in some 
way, being able to use media to report what they 
are experiencing to others, in ‘near real-time’. These 
reports are then picked up by mainstream media 
sources to inform their breaking news packages. An 
especially infamous instance of this occurred during 
the Bataclun Theatre siege in Paris in 2015. Very early 
on, the following tweet was widely reported:
“I’m injured in the first floor of Bataclun. Police 
must intervene now, they are shooting people 
one by one inside.” 
On the surface, situated in a very high pressure 
setting, this message made a compelling and urgent 
plea for police interventions. However, from the 
response point of view, there was a concern that it 
might possibly have been sent by one of the terrorists 
trying to lure police into the venue to occasion a 
violent confrontation. The difficulties in establishing 
the provenance and accuracy of information in the 
early stages of responding to a terror attack, is a 
recurring motif of this analysis.
Police and emergency service practitioners are 
increasingly aware of public audiences’ need for 
information in the minutes following an event, 
and how publics gravitate towards social media in 
the immediate aftermath of a crisis event.61    In a 
position similar to journalists, police and emergency 
services personnel have begun to harness their 
own established and influential online presence at 
times of crisis for quick-time communication and 
reassurance during the “confusion window” of initial 
public reaction. 
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However, there is some suggestion that police 
organizations assume very different stances in 
their strategic communications postures, and their 
preparedness for responding to a major event. Within 
an hour of the Boston marathon bombing in 2013, the 
Commissioner of the Boston Police Department had 
instructed the media relations office to prepare to 
use all social media to ‘push accurate and reliable 
information to the public’.62  In the UK, police forces 
proactively prepared and disseminated online 
messages in the minutes following a suspected 
terror attack, urging networked publics to follow 
them on Twitter or Facebook for further updates of 
official information.  The communications team at 
the UK Metropolitan Police are known to pre-prepare 
messages that can be adapted to specific situations 
to enable a swifter response and their twitter 
followers can opt to receive ‘twitter alert’ notifications 
during a critical, ongoing incident63.  In the aftermath 
of the London Westminster attack in 2017, the first 
communication from the force was on twitter just 
seven minutes later, telling the public that the police 
were aware and dealing with the situation.64  A swift 
online response from Greater Manchester police 
was also observed following the arena bombing the 
same year, with the following tweet within twenty 
minutes of the blast: ‘police responded to reports of 
an incident at Manchester Arena. Please stay away 
from the area. More details to follow’.65
Harm Logics
News in the minutes after an event not only 
imparts information that an event has happened, 
but concurrently elicits (implicitly or explicitly) 
an emotional response with the potential for 
‘affective contagion’.66 The potential for contagion 
is enhanced via online sources because users can 
take the lead in aggregating bits of information and 
62 Edward F. Davies III, Alejandro A. Alves and David Alan Sklansky, “Social Media and Police Leadership: Lessons From Boston,” New Perspectives in Policing Bulletin 
(March 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/244760.pdf 
63 http://www.itv.com/news/2016-03-22/met-police-to-use-twitter-alerts-during-major-incidents-in-london/
64 Ian Griggs, “Inside the Met Police comms response to the Westminster attacks,” PR Week, May 03, 2017, https://www.prweek.com/article/1432250/inside-met-po-
lice-comms-response-westminster-attacks 
65 https://twitter.com/gmpolice/status/866774284018102274
66 Zizi Papacharissi, “Toward New Journalism(s). Affective News, Hybridity, and liminal Spaces,” Journalism Studies, (2014): 27-40. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/146167
0X.2014.890328
67 Anat Shoshani and Michelle Slone, “The Drama of Media Coverage of Terrorism: Emotional and Attitudinal Impact on the Audience,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, 
no. 7 (2008): 627–640, doi: 10.1080/10576100802144064.
68 Donald Matheson and Stuart Allen, Digital War Reporting (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009). 
69 Shayne Bowman and Chris Willis, “We Media: How audiences are shaping the future of news and information,” The Media Centre at the American Press Institute (2003), 
http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/download/we_media.pdf 
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pp. 162-182). London, England: Routledge
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72 Pete Brown, “‘OMG I can’t unsee that’: Lessons from Periscoping the Bangkok bomb blast,” First Draft, August 25, 2015, https://firstdraftnews.org/omg-i-cant-ever-
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receive almost immediate feedback on how others 
in their social networks are experiencing it. 
A controlled study of public reactions to televised 
news coverage of terror found it triggered both 
an emotional and cognitive response in public 
audience members minutes after exposure, 
with high anger and anxiety along with more 
negative attitudes akin to stereotyping and enemy 
perception.67 
Whilst research suggests some public audiences 
appreciate the ‘authenticity’ of instant eyewitness 
media, the traumatic effect of viewing the 
devastation of terror in ‘live time’ can be immediate 
and significant in shaping short-term harm and 
public distress.    Graphic, distressing images of 
victims, chaos and destruction that traditionally 
have been subject to a degree of control and 
editing via institutional ethical procedures68 is now 
made accessible by ‘citizen journalists’69 or ‘citizen 
photographers’70 uploading ‘instant news’ onto 
participatory social media platforms.71   Following 
the Erewan shrine bombing in Bangkok in 2015, 
for example, a witness at the scene live-streamed 
unfiltered footage of victims, triggering some 
distress among the audience.72 
An exception comes from a natural experiment 
and analysis based on the online responses 
of Japanese citizens to the kidnapping of two 
Japanese journalists by the Islamic State. The study 
documents real-time responses to the capture and 
executions of Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa in 
201573.  Here, Japanese social media users began 
an online campaign against the Islamic State (IS). 
Recognizing that terrorists use the spectacle of 
mediated violence to instil fear in observers, these 
citizens refused to be fearful and instead adopted a 
mocking stance, turning Islamic State perpetrators 
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into objects of fun and satire and, at the same 
time, turning the IS into a parody. This removed 
some of the ‘cool factor’ associated with IS in real-
time online. A later study74 of three types of online 
anti-terrorism strategies – countering content, 
parody and satire, and hacking - found satirizing 
targets to be a “promising” tactic, adding that 
74 Christian Reuter, Katja Pätsch, Elena Runft, “IT for Peace? Fighting Against Terrorism in Social Media – An Explorative Twitter Study,” i-com: Journal of Interactive Media 
16, n. 2 (2017): 181-195, doi:10.1515/icom-2017-0013
75 Ibid, 191
satirical approaches typically draw more reactions 
(retweets and likes) than educational content. 
However, these scholars also warn that “none of 
the measures work if they are not addressed to the 
right audience” (ibid. 191).75
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As time advances and the process of 
reaction moves from minutes to hours, 
initial shock subsides and there is a 
shift towards trying to make sense of 
what has happened/is happening, how 
and why. Within the first couple of hours, there 
is routinely a rapid growth in public awareness and 
breaking news may achieve global travel across 
all mainstream media and social media channels. 
These communications are characteristically high in 
emotional energy as groups and individuals register 
their responses.  Press and other publicisers, together 
with members of the public start to communicate 
attributions of blame and responsibility, including 
speculating possible motivations. The affordances 
of digital platforms enable public audiences to 
actively engage in shaping and mobilising reactions, 
or collating sense-making information. This can 
perform an important agenda-setting function for 
wider media coverage at this early stage. Typically 
several hours after the start of any incident, police 
will confirm whether the situation is being treated 
as terrorism.  Depending upon the nature of the 
violence, perpetrators and / or their supporters may 
seek to claim responsibility for the act. Where an 
event is ongoing, people at the scene will continue 
to engage in live reporting, albeit more informative 
control is usually being asserted at this stage by 
76  Brehm, S. S., & Brehm, J. W. (1981). Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and Control. Academic Press.
77 Rachel Sullivan, “Live-tweeting the terror: a rhetorical analysis of @HSMPress_ Twitter updates during the 2013 Nairobi hostage crisis,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 
7, no. 3 (2014): 422-433.
the authorities. Within the space of hours, the first 
official statements will often be made about the 
event. Interestingly, whilst these can be reassuring 
for some, they can often function as ‘lightening rods’ 
for criticism and even elicit reactance-motivated 
responses from some segments of the public who 
resent a perceived loss of a freedom and so adopt an 
attitude or behaviour that is contrary to what they’re 
told. 76 
In circumstances where perpetrators remain actively 
engaged, or at large, some hours after the instigation 
of an event, then new communication challenges 
come in to play.  Perpetrators can actively use 
social media platforms to broadcast their actions, 
threats and ideology, or else challenge the emergent 
narratives from other actors, including the media, 
politicians and practitioners.  The terrorist group 
Al Shabaab, for example, used a twitter account 
(either affiliated or sympathetic to the group) to 
share their perspective, frame a different storyline 
and challenge the narrative from journalists and the 
authorities during a hostage event over several days 
following their attack on a shopping mall in Nairobi.77 
They did not, however, engage in any dialogue with 
other users, who included a host of practitioners 
and policy actors using twitter at this time, thereby 
retaining control of their narrative. 
HOURS
3.3
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Media Logics
As minutes become hours, the reactionary content 
and tone of public posts on media platforms begins to 
change from breaking news and initial information-
seeking towards sentiments associated with grief, 
sympathy and coping. 78  A study of the audio-visual 
content of tweets posted in the hours after the Paris 
Bataclan and Brussels attacks distinguished online 
‘news content’ (screenshots, first-hand footage) from 
‘affective content’ expressing sympathy with victims. 
Within the first three hours, mass media outlets 
had sourced user-generated audio-visual content, 
posting it online to provide ‘on-site’ perspectives of 
the confusion.   Visual images are especially valued 
by them during this period.  Seven hours later, they 
were ‘remediating’ affective content as newsworthy 
in its own right.79  Public audiences purposively 
sought online sources of information from press 
and publicisers such as @BBCbreakingnews and 
@CNN in the hours after, and online mainstream 
media accounts were highly influential in elevating 
and prolonging the ‘dissemination careers’ of event 
content.  In the hours after Brussels, they accounted 
for almost half of audio-visual material being shared 
on Twitter. Ordinary users (including people at the 
scene) faded in online prominence as the hours post-
event increased, supplanted by ‘expert’ interpretive 
commentary from mainstream media sources which 
may continue to cite them as evidence.
78 Kaufmann, “Resilience 2.0”, 972–987.
79 Axel Bruns and Folker Hanusch, “Conflict imagery in a connective environment: audiovisual content on Twitter following the 2015/2016 terror attacks in Paris and 
Brussels,” Media, Culture & Society 39, no. 8 (2017):1122–1141, doi: 10.1177/0163443717725574
80 Jisun An, Haewoon Kwak, Yelena Mejova, Alonso Saenz De Oger, S., Braulio Gomez Fortes, “Are you Charlie or Ahmed? Cultural pluralism in Charlie Hebdo response on 
Twitter,” Proceedings of the 10th International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media (ICWSM) (Cologne, Germany, 2016). 
81 Leysia Palen, Sarah Vieweg, Sophia B. Liu, Amanda Lee Hughes, “Crisis in a Networked World: Features of computer Mediated Communication in the April 16, 2007, 
Virginia Tech Event,” Social Science Computer Review 27, no. 4 (2009). Sara Vieweg, Leysia Palen, Sophia B. Liu, Amanda Lee Hughes, and Jeannette Sutton, “Collective 
intelligence in disasters: Examination of the phenomenon in the aftermath of the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting,” Proceedings from the 5th International ISCRAM Conference (May 5-7, 2008).
As a corollary, the rapidly increasing volume of online 
posts, photos and videos received and shared feeds 
public sense-making, allowing different public 
audiences to develop and articulate alternative 
frames and interpretations of the same event.   It is 
in the hours following events that popular hashtags 
campaigns are initiated by digital communities. 
These circulate widely and function to focus audience 
attention on a few hashtags which signal the topic. 
Twitter reaction to terror in Paris in 2015 saw the 
emergence of the hashtags #CharlieHebdo and 
#JeSuisCharlie to represent freedom of expression 
and freedom of the press in the hours following the 
targeted attack on the French satirical newspaper.80 
Whilst these hashtags travelled fast and wide, 
they were shortly followed by counter-messaging 
hashtags, e.g. ‘#JeSuisAhmed’.  
Another important sense-making communication 
activity during the early hours where uncertainty 
and confusion prevail, involves social networks being 
proactively mobilised by publics to collate and share 
information not yet released by official sources. 
Following the school shooting at Virginia Tech in 
2007, for example, a Facebook page was created by 
members of the public to compile peer-generated 
victim lists at a time when only the number of 
fatalities had been released by official sources.81   
Relatedly, Twitter has been used to organise and 
disseminate crisis information, engage in ‘fact-
finding’ and generate missing person appeals in 
In the UK, Channel 4 News (a mainstream and respected TV broadcaster) falsely identified the perpetrator of 
the London Westminster attack 4 hours later as Abu Izzadeen during its evening news broadcast, substantiating 
rumours and images that had been circulating on twitter an hour earlier. Izzadeen is a well-known hate preacher, 
but one who was quickly proven to be serving a jail sentence at the time of the event.
BOX 3
The ‘media reflex’ to name the perpetrator in the 
hours after an event.
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the hours after an event, prior to official statements 
being released.82  The latter was a strong feature 
of the online public response to the Manchester 
Arena bombing in May 2017 where children and 
young people were quickly named and pictured as 
‘missing’ by worried friends and relatives appealing 
for information on their whereabouts.  Individual 
user appeals quickly utilised shared hashtags and 
so were able to reach the large online audience who 
were tracking the breaking news.   Within hours, mass 
media in the UK and US had collated and published 
online articles on missing children using the pool 
of images circulating on social media at that time. 
Their influential online news feeds set-in-motion 
online processes of sharing, verifying and collating 
information on individuals involved in the tragedy. 
Users actively updated the statuses of individual 
victims with passage of time, marking their photos 
with ticks and crosses. A number of users claimed 
that this was a collective ‘public good’ enabled by 
twitter in a time of shock, crisis and uncertainty.   As 
time went on, however, this online checking activity 
was also aimed at the truth status of missing person 
appeals.  It emerged that a number were fake 
(including those circulated by mass media), using 
photos sourced elsewhere online.  A retrospective 
analysis documented a total of 28 fake appeals in 
circulation after this event83. 
Posts that are highly endorsed and shared on 
social media networks in the hours after an event 
can set or change the direction of collective sense-
making processes, whether these originate from 
press, public or influential – at times controversial 
-  publicisers or politicians.  It is in this time frame 
that potential ‘thought leaders’ or influencers start to 
become prominent communicative voices in relation 
to an event.  Their establishment is supported 
by the algorithmic effects underpinning social 
media platforms. Geared towards providing users 
with personalised content consistent with their 
existing interests, the operations of algorithms can 
82 Thomas Haverin and Lisl Zach, “Twitter for city police department information sharing,” Proceedings of the 73rd ASIS&T Annual Meeting on Navigating Streams in an 
Information Ecosystem 47, no. 41 (2010). Procter et al., “Reading the riots”, 413–436.
83 Crime and Security Research Institute (2018) ‘Soft Facts and Digital Behavioural Influencing: Project Findings Report to the Centre for Research Evidence on Security 
Threats’. Cardiff University. 
84 Beckett, “Fanning the Flames”, 60.
85 Ibid, 60. Oksanen et al., “Perceived societal fear and cyberhate”, 1–20.
86 Crime and Security Research Institute (2018) ‘Soft Facts and Digital Behavioural Influencing: Project Findings Report to the Centre for Research Evidence on Security 
Threats’. Cardiff University.
87 George Haddow and Kim Haddow, 2nd ed., Disaster Communications in a Changing Media World (Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V., 2014), 65.
88 Marthoz, Terrorism and the Media, 47.
89 Ken Bensinger and Andrea Chang, “Boston bombings: Social media spirals out of control,” The Los Angeles Times, April 20, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/
apr/20/business/la-fi-boston-bombings-media-20130420
90 Nicola Bruno, Tweet First, Verify Later? How Real-time Information Is Changing the Coverage of Worldwide Crisis Events (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of 
Journalism, University of Oxford, 2011).
unintentionally create an ‘echo chamber’ of content 
that coheres with users’ existing views, rather than 
a broad spectrum of opinions.84   After a terror 
event, this takes on a greater significance as echo 
chambers serve to amplify division and contribute 
to more polarised debate, particularly around issues 
of religion, ideology and race that can set in motion 
longer term harm.85 
The emergence of ‘soft fact’ rumours and conspiracy 
theories during this time period is an important 
development.   Approximately one hour after the 
2017 London Westminster bridge attack by Islamist 
extremists, twitter was flooded with conspiracy 
theories that the entire event had been ‘spoofed’, 
was a ‘false flag’, a hoax or staged incident.  These 
conspiracy theories typically made highly elaborated 
use of audio-visual material, personal accounts 
from participants and inconsistencies identified in 
materials from press and publicisers to both make 
their point and discredit official accounts.  From this 
tweeted content, subsequent analyses identified 
online groups who actively construct false flag 
narratives around high profile events including, but 
not limited to, worldwide terrorism.86
The propagation of rumours and conspiracies are not 
confined to social media, rather social media can set 
the agenda that press and broadcast media pursue,87 
at times with deleterious consequences.   This feeds 
what has been termed a general ‘media reflex’ to try 
and name the perpetrator as quickly as possible.88 
This has resulted in mainstream media propagating 
and popularising theories, motives and names 
that are subsequently falsified or discredited.  For 
example: CNN mistook the Sandy Hook school shooter 
for his brother in the hours after the incident, whilst 
online forum Reddit identified innocent participants 
as suspects in the Boston marathon bombing89 The 
“tweet first, verify later” approach to news reporting 
online90 can have serious reputational consequences 
for news organizations should they get it wrong. 
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Response Logics
When perpetrators, press and participants all 
engage with social media around an ongoing 
event, observing, reporting and sharing every new 
development as it unfolds, this presents threats and 
challenges to response logics seeking to contain a 
precarious situation and bring it to a close.      In some 
countries, mass media are subject to governance 
in the form of news embargoes or live broadcasting 
bans to facilitate police operations and protect 
participants.91  If not, media restrictions can be 
imposed on the media retrospectively following ill-
advised coverage filmed hours in to an ongoing event. 
Examples of where this has happened include live 
media coverage of the Westgate mall siege in Kenya 
and French media reportage of the whereabouts of a 
victim’s hiding place during the Charlie Hebdo attack.
There are, however, only weak governance 
arrangements pertaining to social media networks 
and little to stop citizen journalists live-reporting 
accounts or images from the scene. During the 2014 
Sydney siege, for example, live-reporting risked 
shifting tactical and operational advantage away 
from police and intelligence agencies, towards the 
perpetrator.92  In respect of the co-ordinated series of 
attacks lasting four days in Mumbai in 2008, a post 
facto analysis concluded that perpetrators could 
have monitored and utilised ‘situational awareness’ 
made available to them via live media and twitter to 
mount further attacks against civilian targets.93    To 
try and mitigate risks associated with participants 
and networked publics communicating situational 
awareness, there are instances where policy and 
practice actors have intervened directly.   During a 
hostage stand-off with a radical Islamist gunman at 
the Paris Hyper Casher grocery store in 2015, police 
issued a social media appeal to the public to cease 
tweeting owing to the risk of situational information 
aiding the perpetrator before armed officers stormed 
the premises some hours later.94 
Even when the perpetrator is immediately 
apprehended or killed at the scene, the demand for 
91 Marthoz, JP (2017) Terrorism and the Media
92 Benjamin Archie, “Tweeting situational awareness during the Sydney siege,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 11, no. 1 (2016): 14–29. 
93 Onook Oh, Manish Agrawal, H. Raghav Rao, “Information Control and terrorism: tracking the Mumbai terrorist attack through Twitter,” Information Systems Front 13 
(2011): 33–43.
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paris-kosher-market-seized-in-second-hostage-drama-in-nervous-france/2015/01/09/f171b97e-97ff-11e4-8005-1924ede3e54a_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_
term=.e91b3ff16118 Archie, “Tweeting situational awareness”, 14-29.
95 Wallen, N (2018) Right designations. Police Professional, 604, May 3rd:  p.17
96 Christian Ehnis and Deborah Bunker, “Social media in disaster response: Queensland police service – public engagement during the 2011 floods,” in Australian Confer-
ence on Information Systems, ed. 23rd J. Lamp  (Geelong. Geelong: ACIS, 2012). Procter et al. 2013 
97 Roberts et al., “After Woolwich”, 434–454.
information from media participants on-the-ground 
can still risk disrupting ongoing operational activity. 
A retrospective account from a Senior Investigating 
Officer at the scene of the street stabbing of MP Jo 
Cox stated that a key learning point was to manage 
the constant demand for updates from journalists by 
delegating it to senior figureheads within the force, 
saying: ‘if I had tried to front the media… I would not 
have been able to get any work done.95
In such circumstances, policy and practice actors 
can also use social media to tackle rumours and 
misinformation.   Following major social disorder 
as it unfolded during the London riots, UK police 
and emergency services used twitter largely as 
a broadcast ‘megaphone’ to provide situational 
reports, retweet these reports for other forces and to 
issue appeals to the public not to circulate rumours.96 
Other police practitioners have used social media 
more as a two-way engagement tool to participate 
in dialogue with those involved during their ongoing 
active engagement in social protest. 
Harm Logics
An intriguing communications dynamic concerns the 
travel patterns of reactions to an incident in the hours 
that follow. Utilising geo-coded meta-data from 
tweets following the murder of Lee Rigby,97 showed 
an intense local reaction, that then ‘leapt’ very 
quickly to other urban centres.  The impacts did not 
therefore travel in ‘waves’ rippling out progressively 
over greater distances but were ‘everywhere all at 
once’. The contents of these messages escalated 
the intensity of the rhetoric, including multiple 
instances of ‘kill speech’. There is evidence from 
other studies that social media travel patterns can 
register internationally within this time frame.  For 
example, the beach attack in Tunisia involving a large 
number of British tourists, and the attacks across 
Paris, Belgium and Germany all increased tensions 
within the UK, albeit less intensively than where the 
violence was actually located.
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Polarisation of opinion and potentially inflammatory 
communications are not unique to social media, 
having also been documented in mainstream media 
analysis following a major terror attack on a nation 
state.  Live blanket coverage after 9/11 and an emotive 
commentary from TV anchors and a host of political 
and policy experts, cued and primed the audience on 
how to interpret what they saw and its wider social 
and political significance.   Within hours, journalists 
and expert sources were actively adopting a frame of 
‘decisive retaliation’, 98 ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
98 Marthoz, Terrorism and the Media, 34.
99 Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Block-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro, Selling fear: Counterterrorism, the media and public opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
nation blaming, and a warfare rhetoric.   The impact 
of the latter, combined with key features of the event 
itself (its international significance, targeted nation 
attack and its highly symbolic targets) triggered 
what Nacos et al.99 term a ‘patriotic reflex’ among the 
viewing public.  This reflex gave unequivocal support 
for the President and for national unity. But arguably 
in doing so, also set the stage for war, and longer-
lasting fear and divisions within society that can 
be reheated by the media with each new reported 
incident of radical Islamist terrorism.
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In the days after a terror event, the 
perpetrator(s) and their cause are 
often officially named and broadcast 
in the media.   At this time, Press and 
Publicisers play an important role in 
rehearsing and negotiating the narrative 
and meanings of the traumatic event, beginning 
to adopt a more questioning stance often amid 
ongoing or directly related operational activities.   A 
key part of the media process at this time involves 
the construction and reporting of a ‘backstory’ for 
both perpetrators and victims associated with the 
event.  A range of actors make public statements 
via the media and often mobilise (online or offline) 
to engage in spontaneous memorials or vigils for 
the victims. The networked public, empowered by 
the affordances of social media platforms, can 
continue to assume a more active role. Scrutinising 
incoming information, engaging in ‘investigations’ 
and reporting misbehaviour can generate ‘collective 
intelligence’.  Such activities are perceived as 
positive, constructive and aligned to ‘civil society’ by 
digital communities, the so-called ‘good’ of social 
media, bringing out the best motivations in people. 
Online activities can also at times serve to cloud 
interpretations of an event with misinformation and 
rumour or provide a ready forum for hate speech.
Terror Logics
Given the state of high alert, uncertainty and 
emotional arousal that follows a terror event, the 
days afterward can be characterised by a higher 
than normal policy and practice responsiveness to 
perceived threats from terrorist groups and their 
supporters. In this way, their terror logic is sustained 
through what can be a series of false-positive 
warnings and reactive operational responses to 
restrict and monitor. The day following the Quebec 
attack in 2014, for example, the national terror threat 
level was raised in Canada owing to an observed 
increase in online chatter from radical groups100. 
Other research has shown that pro-ISIS social 
media activity peaks 24 hours after an event before 
returning to baseline.101
Media Logics
The level of public attention and scrutiny facilitated 
by mass media and social media coverage can remain 
high and its audience reach can remain global. 
Empirical evidence suggests that, after about two to 
three days, general public interest starts to subside 
from its peak, although it can remain relatively 
elevated for an extended period. In terms of press 
and other publicisers, their initial activities will be 
concerned with providing more detailed accounts 
DAYS
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about the key event participants. This will likely 
include the backgrounds and motivations of the 
perpetrators and possibly some victims. 
Over a slightly more extended period of days, media 
focus tends to become responsive, featuring official 
updates from police and political leaders in respect of 
the progress of any criminal investigation, as well as 
unofficial sightings and speculation on enforcement 
activity. Propagation of fear and uncertainty by 
the media is also fed by high profile coverage of an 
ongoing, often highly visible, operational response 
from police and armed services, such as those 
observed post Paris102 and Manchester103.   In the days 
after a major incident, it is not uncommon to read 
and hear about raids of properties in various parts of 
the country, amid reports of a highly dangerous ‘cell’ 
of perpetrators about to be discovered.  There may be 
questioning, arrests, releases without charge, all of 
which are captured by traditional media and reported 
online by witnesses at the scene, neighbours living 
nearby, co-workers and other acquaintances of 
those implicated.
In the preceding passages, impacts upon victims and 
their families were referenced.  Traditional tactics 
engaged in by journalists, such as ‘door-stepping’, 
can be disturbing for those connected to, or 
claimed to have ties to, an incident.   This extends to 
relatives, friends and acquaintances of any alleged 
perpetrators, some of whom have complained 
of media harassment104. In the contemporary 
information environment, they may have to also 
contend with vitriolic ‘trolling’ and seeing images 
of their loved ones being taken from social media 
accounts and repurposed by journalists and other 
social media users.   Post-Manchester, what was an 
innocuous piece of video footage of a man putting out 
the rubbish filmed by his neighbour, took on a new 
meaning and significance when the individual was 
identified as the perpetrator and it became widely 
streamed online by the press105.
However, accenting victims rather than the 
perpetrators106, is one way that the press can ‘bring 
humanity and dignity back into what was a narrative 
of destruction and fear’107.  Humanizing victims and 
102 Angelique Chrisafis, “Thousands of troops on Paris streets but are they France’s new Maginot line? “ The Guardian, April 15, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/
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broadcasting the symbols and processes of grief and 
grieving can be the best counter-terrorism measure 
the mass media can provide. These processes are not 
limited to traditional media and indeed may often 
start on social networks in the minutes and hours 
after an event.  Concerned friends and family can 
actively use these platforms to appeal about missing 
individuals, who are later confirmed online as injured 
or deceased.
In circumstances where a significant volume 
of disinformation is circulating, journalists can 
potentially play an important role in exposing 
messengers and messages propagating deliberately 
false narratives and accounts about an attack. 
Framed by the imperatives of media logic, this can 
provide journalists with a new angle on the story 
to write about, once the key details about who did 
what to whom and why have been settled. ‘De-
bunking’ disinformation is an important element of 
ensuring the public and politicians have an accurate 
understanding of what has transpired. In the UK, 
this has sometimes been enabled by the authorities 
establishing a network of ‘trusted’ journalists, and 
communicating directly with them to highlight 
misinformation and disinformation stories, related to 
the event, that might be circulating on social media. 
Of course, there need to be clear boundaries around 
this kind of activities, so that it does not impede 
expression of legitimate differences of opinion. 
However, exposing deliberate attempts to amplify 
social tensions and divisions post-event, does seem 
an important feature of managing the public harms 
of terrorism in the digital age.  
Response Logics
An emerging element of the overarching story in this 
period are more critical allegations of ‘failure’ on 
the part of police and intelligence services. These 
are routinely lodged by mainstream media stories 
and can build over a number of days, from initial 
suspicions through to more forceful suggestions 
of blameworthiness. It was striking, for example, to 
note how much of the coverage of the Manchester 
bombing in the days afterward, was concerned 
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with criticizing the police, security services and 
government, once it transpired that the perpetrator, 
Salman Abedi, was ‘known’ to them108.
Harm Logics
Secondary instances of violence and other criminal 
acts of visible retaliation aimed at target members 
of a community occur in this timeframe, seeded 
offline and online.  Real-world incidents of hate 
crime, such as the defacement of mosques in the 
wake of Islamist terror, can provide highly symbolic 
images that circulate in the media.  Such incidents 
and reportage can prompt local community support 
and offline efforts to rectify the physical damage109, 
yet for a different audience can galvanise the online 
propagation of hate speech110.   
The murder of Lee Rigby illustrates an intriguing 
innovative intervention that functioned to reduce 
secondary instances of violence in the days following 
108 https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/politics/home-secretary-amber-rudd-admits-10487238
109 https://www.wsj.com/articles/canada-police-hold-2-seek-motive-in-terror-attack-at-mosque-1485791738
110 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/19/former-edl-leader-tommy-robinson-condemned-finsbury-park-mosque/
111 Roberts et al., “After Woolwich”, 434–454.
his death.111  This involved the group Anonymous, 
the so-called ‘hacktivist collective’, publishing 
membership lists for the English Defence League 
(EDL). This was significant because the EDL 
leadership had been organizing significant public 
protests across the country following this event that 
were enabling and encouraging hate crimes. At some 
point, Anonymous decided to intervene by hacking 
into the EDL’s computer system and publishing 
online their membership list and then, subsequently, 
some detrimental personal details relating to some 
of these members. This proved to have a ‘chilling 
effect’ on EDL mobilisation and activity. Whilst one 
would not countenance the specific details of how 
this was achieved, the general principle is potentially 
more interesting:  mediating a ‘distraction’ in order 
to inhibit the potential for harmful activity may have 
some merit.   Consuming the attention, time and 
energy of potentially troublesome groups engaging 
in secondary violence has potential harm reduction 
potential. 
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Moving in to what is typically a post-
event situation, as days become weeks, 
the intensity of general media and 
public interest in the event subsides 
along with acute levels of public fear. This can, 
however, be rapidly reignited at any moment by 
ancillary incidents, such as significant hate crimes, 
‘copycat’ offences, and/or key developments in the 
police investigation being made (or not).  Media and 
social media reportage of re-normalising activities 
and public resilience may be off-set to some degree 
by the malign behaviours of online and offline actors 
with the intent of amplifying social division, anger 
and distrust.
Media Logics
The ‘ripple effects’ an event has on the public 
psyche has been detected over a period of weeks 
and internationally.  Longer-term modelling of the 
social sharing of emotions112 following a crisis event 
shows an initial ‘emergency phase’ (event to 2 weeks 
post-event) that is characterised by intense sharing, 
rumination, arousal and solidarity. This phase shifts 
after 2-6 weeks into a second ‘inhibition phase’, where 
sharing plateaus and then progressively declines.  In 
its place, a third ‘adaption phase’ begins to dominate 
where there are progressive decreases in emotional 
sharing with others, based on both the frequency 
and mode of communications, including on social 
networks.   Following the 2004 Madrid attacks, a shift 
from high event-related emotional arousal, towards 
what could be regarded as more ‘functional’ sharing 
in terms of searching for meaning and shared beliefs 
was reported.113 Eight weeks post-event, survey 
participants reported ‘hearing’ more than ‘talking’ 
about the traumatic event.
This coheres with Smelser’s analysis114  of the kinds 
of emotional reactions terror attacks tend to induce 
over time.  He contends that whilst there are some 
unique properties of emotional reaction to terror 
attacks, there are also  some common affective 
trajectories when compared to other kinds of 
natural disasters and accidents, including:
 Psychic numbing, involving a combination of 
disbelief, denial and suppression of affect.
 Followed by intense emotions of fear, anxiety, 
terror, rage and guilt.
 A surge in both solidarity and ‘scapegoating’.
Outpourings of sympathy.
WEEKS
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He concludes that most attacks deliver an intense, 
but relatively brief, impact upon levels of public fear 
and concern, before public attitudes and perceptions 
tend to return to something approaching their 
normal ‘baseline’ levels.   Public polls in the weeks 
after the Oklahoma City bombing (an act of domestic 
terror) found no longer-term indicator that the 
public’s sense of personal vulnerability to terror was 
elevated, with respondents citing the low probability 
of event occurrence and their lack of agency in being 
able to prevent it in their reasoning.115  
Of significance here in mitigating against a longer-
term fear response are collective processes of 
adjustment and ‘re-normalisation’ facilitated by 
rituals of memorialization reported in media and 
social media.   One week after an event is typically a 
symbolic time for public vigils, silences, fundraising 
efforts and church services that play a role in 
locating the recent event in the collective memory. 
The performance of these ‘set-piece’ events often 
attracts press and broadcast coverage.  Gravitating 
around such events, the role of political and 
policy actors ascends, perhaps eclipsing that of 
practitioners. This can often be a critical period in 
terms of foreshadowing what the possible wider 
political implications of the attack might end up being. 
For example, a notable trend across several recent 
attacks in Europe has been for senior politicians to 
use it as an opportunity to publicly channel blame 
towards the large social media platforms who have 
allowed the perpetrators and their supporters to 
exploit the technologies they provide. 
In keeping with the guiding analytic framework for 
this study, we should not over-state the degree of 
social solidarity that is generated. In liberal societies, 
there is typically ‘push-back’ against government 
narratives, and especially any attempts at ‘blame-
shifting’. An element of this more critical standpoint 
from media sources has to be accepted, but equally, 
it can tip over into an unhealthier state. For instance, 
within weeks, collective rituals that promote 
social solidarity can co-exist with the emergence 
of conspiracy theories.  As a species of soft fact, 
conspiracy theories pivot around highly selective 
interpretations of the ‘known’ facts at that point in 
time and highlight perceived discrepancies between 
different accounts that are circulating. A recent 
report on the ethics of responsible journalistic 
115 Lewis, CW (2000) The terror that failed: public opinion in the aftermath of the bombing in Oklahoma city. Public Administration Review, 60, 3: 201-10.
116 p. 68 In Marthoz, Jean-Paul, Terrorism and the Media: A Handbook for Journalists. Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2017.  
reporting of terror attacks, expressed concern that 
these kinds of contribution can end up ‘polluting 
information flows’116 as they are endlessly repeated 
and widely shared on social networks.
Response Logics
TWO KEY INSIGHTS CAN BE DRAWN OUT THAT 
PERTAIN TO THE ORCHESTRATED RESPONSE 
LOGICS ASSOCIATED WITH TERROR EVENTS 
OVER THE LONGER-TERM:
 There is a general pattern that terror attacks will 
cause secondary incidents of violence, but this is not 
inevitable and does not occur in every case;
 The policing response to terror weeks later 
broadens out from investigating the original event 
to a wider community-impact management role 
associated with coordinating the response to other 
related crimes.
Focusing upon the conduct of the police investigation, 
as was intimated in the previous section, it has 
become routine for police, security service officials 
and government representatives to have to manage 
potentially ‘discreditable’ information about their 
performance. Looking across the aftermaths of 
recent attacks in the UK, France and the US, it 
has often been revealed by media sources that 
the perpetrators were previously ‘known’ to the 
authorities in some capacity, and warning signals 
were missed. 
In terms of our temporal modelling, rumours of such 
contacts typically emerge in the days following 
the atrocity, but tend to be officially confirmed, 
elaborated and reported in the weeks after.  In this 
time frame, information may enter the public domain 
that perpetrators were subject to a no-fly ban, were 
on a European watchlist or were acting in ‘plain 
sight’ posting inflammatory posts on social media 
encouraging violent acts.    Such information requires 
attempts at reputation management, and a series of 
explanations and justifications are offered by senior 
intelligence and police representatives as to how 
and why it was not possible to prevent the tragedy 
that has unfolded.  This is significant because if 
the media and other social media publicizers get 
behind narratives of disquiet, then the pressure for 
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some kind of inquiry or review to be commissioned 
becomes more assertive. These kinds of pressures 
become even more acute where suspects remain at 
large and are not secured by police.
Harm Logics
Evidence of how the social tensions triggered by a 
terrorist event can induce more malign harms over a 
period of weeks, can be garnered by examining the 
aftermaths of four of the attacks that happened in the 
UK in 2017. Figure 1 below displays police recorded 
crime data for England and Wales for a three-week 
period following the Westminster, Manchester Arena, 
London Bridge and Finsbury Park attacks. The data 
is a percentage comparison with the same period 
for the previous year (which was following the Brexit 
vote where hate crime levels increased compared to 
2015).
These data show that, in three out of the four attacks, 
there was a net percentage increase in the number of 
hate crimes reported to and recorded by police. The 
outlier is the Finsbury Park incident, which unlike the 
other three, was committed by a perpetrator with a 
far-right political motivation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
117 https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf
118https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/now-available-more-200-000-deleted-russian-troll-tweets-n844731
given the especially heinous nature of the violence 
committed, the Manchester Arena bombing triggered 
the largest increase in ‘retaliatory’ hate crimes 
recorded by police in the first week, which persisted 
into weeks two and three.
A recent development connected to the empirical 
data presented in Figure 1 above, finds evidence 
of Kremlin backed ‘spoof’ social media accounts 
deliberately seeking to amplify social divisions and 
tensions following these four UK events.   Adding to 
open source confirmations from recent publications 
issued by the US Senate117, NBC News118 and RBK of 
faked Russian accounts and propaganda narratives, 
the key insights are summarized in Box 4 below.
Given how recent this phenomenon is, it is difficult 
to know whether foreign government influence 
and interference operations of this kind have been 
present in other terror events, and the extent to 
which such attempts at harm amplification might be 
anticipated in the future. In policy and practice terms, 
this development is potentially quite profound: it 
suggests that local contests over interpretation and 
meaning can be inflected by geo-political conflicts.
47 different confirmed Russian accounts were operating on Twitter and 
disseminated messages about all four UK terror events in 2017. Eight of 
these 47 accounts were especially active in the weeks that followed.
 These generated in excess of 153,000 shares.
 A cluster of these accounts had been set up towards the end of 2014, several years previously.
 These accounts adopted ‘spoof’ identities, mimicking digital social identities across the 
ideological spectrum. The majority presented as right-wing personas, but others were presented as 
more civil libertarian in orientation.
 The strategy was clearly to ‘infiltrate and incite’ established thought communities online. They 
were seeking to exploit existing concerns already circulating amongst particular groups.
 These accounts also made use of materials generated by Russian mainstream media sources 
such as Russia Today.
 The accounts shared and retweeted some of the most controversial narratives associated with 
the four attacks.
BOX 4
Evidencing disinformation following UK 
acts of terror in 2017.
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Longer-term  impacts and consequences 
stretching over months and years derive 
from some (not all) terror events and 
how they are represented in the media. 
In this time-frame, a specific event (or series of 
events) may be remediated in traditional media and 
social media for a variety of purposes.   Any impacts 
may be reignited by the launch of formal inquiries 
and reviews to document and ‘learn the lessons’ 
of the incident.   Specific events are referenced 
to interpret and justify the tenor of new laws and 
legislative instruments.  Established narratives of 
grievance about extremist action, particularly in the 
wake of future threats and activity, are ‘refreshed’ 
and ‘reheated’ by evoking that event particularly at 
significant time markers for memorialising activity, 
(e.g. at one-year anniversaries). Mediated content 
months and even years after an event therefore 
can continue to encapsulate elements of media, 
harm and response logics.  More pragmatically, it is 
important because of how it can facilitate malign 
attempts to radicalize new recruits to a terrorist 
cause long after the intensity of the media focus has 
shifted away from the proximate, visceral reactions 
of shock, horror and emotional tragedy.
Terror Logics
Three years after the Sydney siege, the New South 
Wales State Coroner held an inquest into the deaths 
119 Magistrate Michael Barnes, Inquest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege: Findings and Recommendations (Sidney, New South Wales:  State Coroner of 
New South Wales, 2017), 4. 
which was also tasked with examining the actions of 
police and authorities before and during that event119. 
The role of the media and social media whilst the 
event was ongoing was a particular focus and so the 
inquest is significant in retrospectively documenting 
the terror logics underlying this particular event.   
Key extracts from the inquest are:
 Media monitoring from the siege site.
 The perpetrator, Monis, enlisted the hostages in 
monitoring the media – traditional and online – for 
reports on the siege.
 The perpetrator directed hostages to call media 
outlets.
 At various times, Monis directed hostages to call 
TV and radio stations to deliver announcements and 
demands or attempt to influence coverage None of 
the media outlets broadcast these calls.
 Social media posts and videos from the hostages 
were broadcast.
 Hostages posted the perpetrators’ demands on 
social media, including Facebook. Some mass media 
reported on these social media posts.
 Hostages videos of Monis’ demands were sent to 
media outlets in an effort to have them broadcast. 
MONTHS
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The media complied with police requests not to 
broadcast the videos and so, as a result, the hostages 
uploaded them onto YouTube. These videos were 
removed by police at a later time.
 Expert evidence on messaging through media and 
social media.
 Negotiation experts provided advice that police 
press conferences and other media messages should 
have been more strategic, crafted in such a way as 
to try and influence the perpetrators behaviour.
 Experts also suggested police should have worked 
with Monis’ family or solicitor to craft messages for 
social media to communicate with him and try to 
engage him with police negotiators.
 Management and impact of the media during the 
incident.
 Various media outlets broadcast live video of the 
café during the Siege.
Box 5, below, cites the main recommendation 
from the inquest, significant because it explicitly 
addresses the interface of media and response 
logics during an ongoing terror event.
Recommendation 23: … ‘that the Commission of Police consider 
seeking an agreement with news media outlets whereby the NSWPF will 
establish a way for such outlets to rapidly and confidentially determine 
whether publishing specific material could compromise the response to 
an ongoing high-risk situation and the media in turn will agree not to 
publish such material without first alerting a nominated senior police 
officer of their intention to do so.
BOX 5
Recommendation from the Inquest into the deaths 
arising from the Lindt Café siege.
Media Logics
It is not only policy and politics at play in the longer 
term, an example from Canada illustrates how media 
logics shape how and when relevant information 
pertaining to an event can enter the public domain in 
‘slow-time’ to respond to, and shape, public opinion, 
politics and policy responses.
See Box 6  on the following page. 
Response Logics
Response Logics are engaged with a shift more 
towards how the procedural and legislative landscape 
is responding to the event.  These policy and practice 
adaptations can be set in motion by issues and 
weaknesses in response frameworks that have been 
120 Commonwealth of Australia, Martin Place siege: Joint Commonwealth - New South Wales review (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, January 2015), 65. 
highlighted by preceding media and social media 
coverage. An example discussed in some detail here 
is based on the 2014 Sydney siege, that engaged the 
political and policy sphere in triggering the conduct 
of an official review and inquest, to shape the future 
trajectory of public policy and legislation concerning 
the role of communications and media.
The official Federal government review and inquest 
that followed the siege attended to the role of 
communications and the media, considering state 
and federal official compliance with appropriate 
communications protocols during the two-day siege. 
Focusing solely on official communications activities, 
the review found that communications with the 
public were timely, effective and aligned with relevant 
protocols.120 Activities undertaken by the New South 
Wales Police Force established operations on the 
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understanding that the incident was terror-related, 
although this was not communicated publicly at 
the time121. This included activating the New South 
Wales Crisis Policy Committee, who coordinated and 
approved public messaging during the incident, with 
New South Wales Police taking the lead in providing 
operational updates to the public. Consideration 
was also given to the risk of further violence or 
retaliatory attacks off the back of the incident122 
and recommendations made regarding future 
cooperation with the media (Box 7 opposite). 
In the aftermaths of recent terrorist attacks, public 
remonstrations from senior figures within the security 
agencies have also exerted pressure on governments 
to enhance their legal powers to tackle a ‘morphing’ 
and adapting threat. This siren call is potent for 
politicians who perceive they need to be seen to be 
‘doing something’, and almost automatically reach 
for the formulation and introduction of new laws as 
their principal response123. 
121 Ibid, 66
122 Ibid, 70
123 Innes, M., Roberts, C. Lowe, T (2017) A disruptive influence? “Prevent”-ing problems and countering violent extremism policy in practice. Law and Society Review, 51, 
2: 252-81.
Since 9/11 in the UK, this ‘legislative reflex’ has been 
manifested in seven separate pieces of legislation, 
not all of which judicial scrutiny. 
 the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, 
which allowed for detention without trial (later 
overturned by the courts); 
 the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, introducing 
the ‘control order’ (also overturned); 
 the Terrorism Act 2006, that extended the detention 
of suspects without charge from 14 to 28 days; 
 the Terrorism Order 2006, enabling the Treasury to 
freeze the assets of suspects;
 the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, under which police 
were permitted to continue questioning suspects 
after charge; 
 the Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act 2010; 
 the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill. 
Events: Oct 20th Oct 22nd, 2014 ‘lone-wolf’ attacks on Canadian soldiers in Quebec and Ottawa. 
These closely timed (but unconnected) attacks on soldiers in Canada represented the first fatal 
terrorism attacks on Canadian home soil attributed to ISIS or Al-Qaeda. 
Perpetrators: ISIS affiliates.
The Ottawa perpetrator, Zehaf-Bibeau, had videoed himself recording his motives earlier on the 
day of the attack but had not broadcast the video. Four months later this material was put in to 
the public domain for discussion after mounting pressure to do so.  A citizen’s photo of Zehaf-
Bibeau taken just prior to his attack was confiscated at the scene by a police officer who then 
re-photographed the image.  The photo surfaced seven hours after the shooting on Twitter, with 
the source linked to an ISIL account.  Twitter responded within an hour to suspend that account, 
but later police investigations suggested that the photo may have been purposively leaked by 
police outside of Canada. Other footage later broadcast from the scene was from CCTV and 
television cameras that captured the sound of the final gunfight. Months after the two attacks, 
the government had acted on perceived ‘points of failure’ identified from these events and moved 
to revamp national security laws in anticipation of future attacks. A new Anti-Terrorism Act was 
introduced in 2015. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police also established ‘Project Savvy’ with the 
aim of proactively searching for threats on open source media. In 2018, Facebook posts were 
used as evidence in a deportation trial of a man suspected of inciting terrorist violence.
BOX 6
Responding to Terror Attacks in Canada
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New legislation has become an almost ritualized 
part of the societal response logic to major terrorist 
attacks. These new legal instruments have had an 
important framing influence upon the progressive 
development of, and adjustments to, the UK’s 
cross-government CONTEST strategy, introduced to 
provide a comprehensive response to the changing 
international terrorist threat post-2005.
Harm Logics
Groups with extreme views, both broadly supportive 
of or antithetical to those of the perpetrator, begin 
early on to interpret the specific details associated 
with an event in a way coherent with their ideas 
and values.  However, there can be longer lasting 
influences associated with these broadcasts too, 
because such messages seek to connect the recent 
event with a broader narrative of grievance.  This 
feeds harm logics, whereby such messages seek 
to amplify and sustain social divisions online and 
offline.   For example, on the night of the Manchester 
Arena Bombing in 2017, Tommy Robinson, the former 
leader of the English Defence League made a date 
connection with the Lee Rigby murder 4 years earlier. 
He tweeted the following message that was widely 
shared and endorsed: “On the anniversary of Lee 
Rigby’s horrific murder it looks like we have been 
attacked again #Manchester”.  
124 https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/24/darren-osborne-uk-mosque-attack-suspect-read-infow/
125 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44359958
Over the longer term, such connections can be 
significant in how events are interpreted and have 
ongoing, malign narratives constructed around them. 
They are also implicated for their role in radicalising 
individuals and moving them into a mindset where 
they are willing to engage in violence.    Evidence for 
this can be found in cases such as Darren Osborne 
the perpetrator of the 2017 Finsbury Park vehicle 
attack upon worshippers who had just left the local 
mosque.  At his trial, it was reported that prior to 
deciding upon his course of action, he had ‘binge 
watched’ material on the online site ‘InfoWars’ about 
previous Islamist inspired events in the period prior to 
his crimes124. Similarly, Safaa Boular, an 18-year-old 
woman from London who was convicted of plotting 
a terror attack on the British Museum in June 2018, 
was alleged to have been radicalized online125 in the 
wake of the 2015 Paris terror attacks.
1. ‘Media representatives should be offered access to government-led training exercises to 
further improve cooperation in the event of future terrorism incidents’.
2. ‘The National Security Public Information Guidelines should be updated to ensure relevant 
agencies in all States and Territories have clear guidance on accessing information and 
communicating with the public’.
BOX 7
Recommendations from the Federal government 
review about communications during the Martin 
Place siege.
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CHAPTER 4.
Recommendations for 
Policy and Practice
Many of the problems with how media and social media communicate 
information during and after terror events are symptomatic of wider 
and deeper challenges associated with the contemporary information 
environment. There is, after all, considerable general public and political 
disquiet at the current time about the malign influence of misinformation 
and disinformation as it is impacting across a range of social institutions 
and situations.  Given the current climate, it is important to differentiate 
between those more general, societal level mitigations and solutions, 
and other initiatives more specifically targeted to managing the 
consequences of terror events.
KEY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANALYSIS PRESENTED ARE THAT: 
Counter-terrorism policy design should attend more closely to the post-event situation. 
For understandable reasons, policy development and research attention has focused 
‘upstream’, upon how processes of violent radicalisation can be interdicted to prevent the 
onset of violence in the first place. 
Terrorist violence is intended as a provocation to elicit intense and vivid reactions, the 
relative neglect of how to manage post-event situations, what we label ‘post-event 
prevent’, is a current weak point in many governmental counter-terrorism frameworks. If 
it is accepted that it will not be possible to prevent all future terror plots, then a reasonable 
and pragmatic aim is that the harm induced by those that do occur be reduced and 
mitigated. The label ‘post event prevent’ reflects its primary concern with constraining the 
consequences triggered in the wake of an attack. 
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4.1   Minutes to Months (M2M) 
Matrix 
Subject to some further development, the evidence 
and insights set out above could be distilled to inform 
a strategic communication ‘playbook’ to support this 
post-event prevent strategy. This playbook would 
provide a structured, holistic approach to manage 
the relative and aggregated influence of media and 
social media communications during and after terror 
events. The concepts developed herein afford a 
potentially useful framework for such an approach. 
The M2M framework could be adapted by strategic 
communications professionals as a tool for gauging 
the influence of media communications upon any 
social harm footprint induced by an event, enabling 
them to target attention and effort on those 
aspects that matter most for a particular incident. 
Illustrating this possibility, Table 1 draws together 
what the evidence suggests are key communicative 
actions, organised by temporal phase and according 
to key responsible actors into a matrix. The matrix 
conveys the complexity of communications activities 
performed during and after terror events, whilst 
simultaneously drawing the interacting components 
and elements together to provide a single picture.
In terms of its practical application, the matrix is 
useful because it can be adapted to reflect how the 
specific qualities of the terror event, the motivations 
of the perpetrators, together with the situation 
and setting of occurrence, are all consequential in 
shaping the communications dynamics and harm 
management challenges generated. 
The M2M matrix captures how communications 
issued by authorities can amplify, as well as 
constrain, the harms and consequences induced by 
the original violence. The following sections expand 
the matrix contents.
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MINUTES HOURS DAYS WEEKS MONTHS
Perpetrators Communicate live 
from scene, or co-opt 
others to do so.
Supporters claim the 
act.
Ongoing perpetrator 
dialogue if event 
ongoing.
If ongoing, harness 
media coverage for 
situational awareness.
Lambast ‘passive’ 
moderates.
Aftershocks – 
retaliatory attacks.
Online chatter 
amongst supporters.
Use the event to try 
and radicalize others.
Retrospective 
reporting (by others) 
interpreting their 
logics and actions.
Participants Real-time reporting. 
Rumour circulation.
Contact missing 
relatives/friends.
Victims identified. 
Feature in media 
stories, with human 
interest angle.
‘Hero and villain’ 
stories.
Testimonies on chaos 
at scene.
Anniversaries and key 
events used to tell 
more detailed ‘survivor 
stories’.
Public Register shock & 
horror on social 
networks.
Follow breaking news.
Uncertainty about 
what is happening.
Uncertainty continues.
Lots of soft facts 
communicated, esp. in 
information vacuum.
Early sense-making, 
connecting bits 
of information, to 
construct provisional 
narratives.
Hashtag campaigns 
initiate and continue 
for days.
Grieving and 
emotional sharing.
Resilience & 
solidarity actions (eg 
memorials).
Emergence of more 
critical voices. 
Polarised public 
opinion.
General public 
attention subsides.
Acute fear and anxiety 
triggered dilutes.
Resilience actions 
online and offline.
Public pressure to 
release information, or 
launch enquiry.
Anniversaries can 
reignite interest.
.
Police & 
Practitioners
Announce incident & 
attendance.
Channel public 
interest to social 
media channels.
Confirm terror 
incident.
Establish media 
monitoring capability.
Communicate ‘hard 
facts’, don’t rebut ‘soft 
facts’, little ‘dialogue’.
Official statements.
Identify suspects 
& appeal for info to 
assist investigation. 
Enforcement actions 
against wider suspect 
networks (can 
continue for weeks 
and months).
Handle reputationally 
damaging info about 
‘known suspects’.
Updates on 
investigation.
Broadening role for 
community impact 
management.
Defend against 
reputational concerns. 
Criminal justice 
proceedings.
Learn from inquiries 
and/or reviews.
Press & 
Publicisers
Breaking news 
reports.
Remediate social 
media sources, 
especially images. 
Live blogs.
Contact eyewitnesses.
Vulnerable 
to spreading 
misinformation.
Speculate suspect 
identity & motives.
Integrate affective 
content into news 
content. 
Algorithmic effects 
on influential voices 
& journalists co-opt 
hashtags.
Credible sources for 
official definitions of 
the situation.
‘Framing contests’, 
different groups 
compete to set the 
agenda. 
Identify concerns 
about police/
intelligence services. 
Fill in the backstories 
of participants.
Broadcast public 
statements from a 
range of sources.
Report police 
operations.
Expose accounts.
Comments on 
investigation progress 
(or lack of).
Blame attribution 
(where appropriate).
Interpretations 
more in line with 
established political 
values.
Report a return to 
‘normality’.
Report on any criminal 
trials and geo-political 
connections.
Report significant 
events, such as 
anniversaries, 
inquests, new laws.
Policy & 
Politics
“We will not live in 
fear” type statements.
Expressions of 
sympathy / concern.
Calls for resolute 
responses. 
Amplifying first 
responders 
communications.
Praise for emergency 
services, but this can 
‘tip’ to critique.
‘Expert sources’ used 
by media.
Civil society groups 
make public 
statements and often 
mobilise.
Handle ‘known 
suspects’ type 
revelations.
Bi-partisan 
interpretations of the 
event.
Calls for review or 
enquiry.
Questions about wider 
counter-terrorism 
implications.
New legislation 
responding 
to identified 
weaknesses.
Establish review / 
enquiry.
Table 1. Minutes to Months Matrix
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The period immediately following the occurrence of 
terrorist violence is marked by confusion and high 
degrees of uncertainty about what has happened. 
Initial public awareness is created by participants 
in the event tweeting messages, or using other 
social media platforms, to alert their followers. Such 
messages are picked up and rapidly relayed by other 
media outlets. 
In these circumstances it is important for police to 
make an early public statement and then to update 
this when they can. This is preferable to delaying 
any comment, which will create space for other 
voices to speculate, and spread misinformation 
and disinformation. 
This position presumes police have available a 
standing capacity to systematically monitor social 
media across multiple platforms. Such a capability 
potentially affords direct policing benefits in 
terms of being able to rapidly collate visual images 
and text shared by event participants that may 
have intelligence or evidential value to any police 
investigation. This is important in light of evidence 
from the 2017 UK attacks that suggests members of 
the public were far more willing to share their images 
with journalists than submit them via the police’s 
official collection portal.
A defining quality of social media in particular 
is the velocity with which breaking news can be 
shared. It means that reaction to major terror events 
potentially have an ‘everywhere all at once’ quality in 
terms of how public awareness and impacts ‘travel’. 
Social media travel  is important because it means 
that community impacts from a terror event can 
be experienced over a wide geographic area. 
Whilst there is some research evidence relating 
to this phenomenon, it probably warrants future 
investigation to determine more coherently how, 
when and why such travel patterns do (and do not) 
occur. Recent incidents suggest improved practice is 
starting to be implemented in digital first responses. 
This is not to under-estimate the challenges involved. 
Knowing what to say when the situation is chaotic 
and uncertain is difficult. 
Some core principles are: establish an authoritative 
and credible messenger;  be clear about the 
message that can be delivered at that moment; 
foster public awareness without causing alarm; 
and, be willing to directly counter-message against 
any incipient rumours before they can establish 
traction. 
Local agencies should agree who is going to take 
strategic communications lead in the event of 
any terror attack, rather than improvising any 
such arrangements in the chaos and confusion 
following one. It is important that messaging is 
pre-prepared, coordinated and consistent between 
agency partners. Other partners should amplify 
these messages to their networks, rather than 
messaging independently. This level of discipline is 
vital because any inconsistencies and discrepancies 
will be exploited subsequently by the authors 
of conspiracy theories. Evidence suggests that 
uncorrected misinformation functions as a ‘seed’ for 
more deliberate disinformation propagation. 
There is a ‘digital golden hour’ principle, just as 
police investigators think in terms of a ‘golden hour’ 
of criminal investigation where their initial actions 
exert a structuring influence over their subsequent 
activities. This holds that the early communications 
made by police, event participants and others, do a lot 
of work in framing subsequent public interpretations 
and understandings.
MINUTES
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A  key development to be anticipating and monitoring 
at this time is interventions by groups ideologically 
opposed to the suspected perpetrators, since their 
communications may start to try and amplify a 
sense of risk and incite anger.
Communications activities in the first hours following 
an attack, will in part, reflect the scale of the 
violence that has been performed and whether the 
perpetrators are still active, or have been neutralized. 
During this period, one can expect supporters of the 
perpetrators to ‘claim’ the act, and for police and 
government responders to officially define it as a 
terrorist incident. This accompanies an explosion in 
public awareness and communications about the 
event, many of which include speculative ‘soft facts’. 
The presence of multiple, over-lapping narratives of 
‘who did what to whom and why’ is the ‘new normal’. 
This becomes especially apparent in the hours after 
an attack. A defining quality of the contemporary 
media environment is how it comprises multiple 
organizations and actors whose communications 
sometimes complement, and other times contest 
one another. However, they are all collectively 
contributing to the definition of the situation and 
public narrative produced. Press and broadcast 
journalists are operating under considerable 
commercial pressure to achieve scoops and break 
news, and there are times when this compromises 
their ability to filter credibile material sourced from 
‘citizen journalists’ at the scene.   In this context, the 
ability of police or government to be able to control 
the unfolding public narrative is limited. 
A strategic communications capacity and 
capability needs to be established during this 
period to perform two functions: (1) provide timely 
and accurate updates about what is known at that 
time; (2) issue rapid rebuttals of any information 
that is known to be false. Typically, responses 
have focused upon the first of these, but evidence 
suggests that from a ‘harm reduction’ perspective, 
the latter is also increasingly vital. Authorities 
should be prepared to message ‘polyphonically’, 
targeting specific audience segments. Linked to 
the above point, it is important that all messaging 
is carefully and precisely targeted.  It is misleading 
to assume that the same message can be delivered 
to those sympathetic to the terrorists’ ideas as to the 
general public. 
One recent innovation observed and worth 
highlighting, is senior officials making proactive 
statements that try and anticipate trouble and 
influence the behaviour of key segments of the 
audience. In addition to any material effects this may 
have on hate crime, it can function as an important 
signal to communities who might be feeling vulnerable 
following the attack. This is important because, in the 
hours following an incident, ‘retaliatory’ messaging 
from those who self-define as ideological opponents 
of the suspected perpetrators and their supporters 
is likely to be seen. 
As well as implications for police and other 
governmental agencies, there are also clear 
responsibilities for journalists and other professional 
communicators.  Much has been made of the 
dilution of their influence over the media-sphere 
as it has been rendered more complex.  From the 
cases reviewed, media actors appear to retain 
an important agenda-setting role in the wake of 
terror events as credible sources of information. 
Equally however, when mainstream media sources 
mis-report aspects of an event, even if it is quickly 
corrected, it provides an accelerant for online 
conspiratorial thought communities. 
HOURS
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From a communications perspective, as the process 
of reaction moves from hours into days, the initial 
sense of shock subsides, and forms of public sense-
making take over. Typically, this includes a more 
detailed understanding of what has happened, who 
was involved and their motivations. 
During this period, considerable policing effort may 
have to be directed towards managing ‘secondary’ 
instances of violence, including hate crimes against 
people and property symbolically associated 
with the social identities of those committing the 
original violence. This typically includes offensive 
behavior and language communicated through digital 
channels, as well as responding to media reporting of 
retaliatory attacks. One method to inform this aspect 
would be for police communications professionals 
(and similar partner agency representatives) to 
conduct joint exercises with a network of trusted key 
press and broadcast journalists. Just as exercises 
are used to understand weaknesses in physical 
responses to major events, a similar logic could be 
applied to understanding strategic and tactical 
public communications. 
This could be extended by ensuring that, in the days 
after an incident, regular briefings are provided to 
this network of trusted contacts spanning different 
media outlets. They can play an important role in 
exposing disinformation messengers and messages. 
As a note of caution, this should not tip over into 
propaganda, as it needs to be recognized that 
reporters may surface negative information. But the 
‘bigger picture’ need is to find a way to counteract the 
multiple misinformation and disinformation rumours 
and conspiracies that are circulated on social media 
platforms.
An important objective for post-event strategic 
communications during the sense-making period 
is to prohibit perpetrators of the act, or their 
supporters, crafting a narrative that projects an 
aura of malign power. Following an atrocity, where 
death and/or destruction has been caused, there is 
clearly a temptation for those commenting upon it 
to construct the author of the act as a de facto ‘folk 
devil’. Indeed, this is something that communications 
by those sympathetic to the perpetrator will often 
seek to amplify. Therefore, it is important to ensure 
that no messages are sent by the authorities that 
unintentionally enhance the perceived power 
and sophistication of the perpetrators. Indeed, 
there is indicative evidence to suggest that where 
‘discrediting’ information about the perpetrators 
is uncovered, carefully publicizing this can have a 
role in lessening the aggregate harm, because it 
punctures the notion that the event was committed 
by a macabre ‘mastermind’. 
A very recent development, and we do not yet fully 
understand how widespread it is, involves foreign 
states running influence and interference measures 
using a full spectrum of mass media and social 
media-based sources. The intent appears to be to 
amplify and exacerbate domestic social tensions, 
and to seed confusion so that people don’t know 
what information or institutions they can trust 
anymore.  The  consequence is that local conflicts 
gravitating around an event are inflected by geo-
political conflicts. At present, there is very little 
evidence that can be drawn upon to guide what is 
effective in managing the impacts of these newly 
emergent disinformation campaigns.    
DAYS
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There may be a balance to be struck by authorities 
between short-term and longer-term consequences 
of decisions about how and when to intervene. For 
instance, the occurrence of hate crimes in the wake 
of a terror event involves clear harms. However, the 
revulsion such acts trigger amongst many members 
of the public can transition into enhanced community 
cohesion and resilience over the longer term. In 
the weeks after a major attack, there are typically 
surges in both solidarity and ‘scapegoating’. Thus, 
a conundrum for policy and practice development 
is that, in seeking to do something about the latter, 
interventions do not interfere with the organic social 
processes that induce the former. 
Similar challenges surround the issue of what to 
do about orchestrated ‘bot’ and ‘troll’ online activity, 
whose communications deliberately seek to amplify 
social divisions and tension. Currently we lack 
good evidence about what these achieve. Ongoing 
work suggests that most such accounts achieve 
very little, but there are a few that potentially exert 
a considerable influence. Governments could 
introduce regulatory instruments requiring social 
media companies to establish effective measures 
to suspend the ‘power few’ accounts that create 
problems within one hour of them being detected.
Configuring and understanding the contours of this 
problem accurately is important. To date, we perceive 
that public and political attention has rather been 
captured by a concern with anti-social bots, because 
they are relatively visible - an intriguing, but not 
especially consequential, feature of the new media 
ecosystem. Policy innovations should not be unduly 
concerned with, or swayed by, metrics from social 
media providers showing large numbers of bots 
being suppressed or deleted. Rather, effort needs 
to be focused upon the ‘power few’, the ‘hidden 
persuaders’, that potentially have more profound 
influence effects and are more difficult to detect. 
WEEKS
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Past attacks are used to radicalize future potential 
perpetrators, therefore establishing a suite of 
effective interventions designed to interact with how 
media and social media are used to communicate in 
the wake of terror attacks is important. Individuals 
such as Darren Osborne, who committed a vehicle-
based attack on worshippers outside Finsbury Park 
Mosque in London in 2017, were clearly fuelled 
by their interpretation of past-Islamist inspired 
atrocities. 
More broadly, communications activities in the 
months following an attack will be associated with 
significant developments in the police investigation, 
and any inquests or trial proceedings. 
An important consideration for this time-period 
is handling potentially ‘discrediting’ information 
about the performance of the intelligence and 
security services. As was highlighted by the review 
of evidence, in the clear majority of cases it has 
transpired that terrorist offenders were previously 
known to the authorities, who oftentimes had been 
in contact with them. Although this pattern creates 
reputational risk for the agencies concerned in 
terms of overall public trust and confidence, we 
have not uncovered any evidence to suggest that 
this has caused long-term negative impacts upon 
public opinion. However, there is probably merit in 
organizations collaborating with their international 
peers to establish future good practices in this 
regard. 
As a general trend, as we move further away from the 
event, so a greater proportion of the media traffic can 
be defined as political communication. For example, 
whether legislative reforms are needed is a common 
theme some months after a high-profile event.
Bringing these insights together, in terms of 
managing the immediate reaction phase over the 
first hours and days, a potential area of investment 
is in a ‘4D’ strategy.  This is a strategy that both 
reactively and proactively intervenes in respect of 
known key communication nodes that might be 
seeking to amplify the impacts of an attack: 
Distract – run interventions that consume the 
attention, time and energy of the key agitators, so 
that they cannot co-ordinate their more harmful 
activities.
Disrupt – for example surging ‘take-downs’ of 
social media accounts sympathetic to perpetrators 
or those supporting violence.
Deny – issue rapid rebuttals of any potentially 
consequential rumours, fake news or conspiracy 
theories across multiple channels.
Delay – the intent behind these coordinated 
tactics is to try and ensure that any inflammatory 
communications are ‘pushed’ outside of the reaction 
phases where they can do most harm. Once a public 
definition of the situation becomes less ambiguous, 
then misinformation and disinformation are likely to 
be less consequential.
MONTHS
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SUMMARY
The implementation of the 4D strategy to disrupt and de-stabilize harmful 
communications should be understood as informed by, and predicated 
upon, the key insights and evidence that have been set out in the preceding 
sections. In particular, there are a number of initiatives and investments 
that police, government and civil society partners can do in order to expose 
and constrain the negative impacts that mass media and social media 
communications can have. These can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. In the minutes and hours following an attack make an early statement about what is 
known and unknown at the current time and update this periodically. This is important in 
diminishing the space for rumours and propaganda.
2. Establish a strategic communications capacity and capability, to include a single 
authoritative messenger for public communications and steer messaging through them. 
3. If the attack is ongoing, be prepared to ask citizens at the scene(s) to desist from using 
social media in case it is affording the perpetrators enhanced situational awareness.
4. Co-ordinate messaging across partner agencies to ensure consistency and complementarity.
5. Implement a social media listening capacity and capability early on with a particular focus 
upon groups inciting anger and / or social tensions.
6. Utilize social media listening for rumours, fake news and conspiracy theories, this should 
include foreign influence and interference operations. When detected implement rapid 
rebuttals’
7. Message ‘polyphonically’ and proactively recognizing that different platforms and channels 
engage particular segments of the public.
8. As the immediate post-event reaction phase passes, prepare communications designed to 
‘puncture’ the glamour of any perpetrators. This could involve satire, or ‘boosting’ messages 
by community-based opponents of the terrorist groups.
9. Set up a network of trusted journalist contacts and brief them regularly, including about 
known sources of disinformation. They can be helpful in exposing these to the wider public.
10. Be prepared to implement tactics that distract, disrupt, deny or delay messaging from other 
actors that might amplify the aggregate harm of the incident.
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusions
The intent underpinning this report 
is that by synthesizing the available 
knowledge and evidence about the role 
of media and social media, evidence-
based insights should be derived to 
provide a platform for developing a 
‘playbook’ to inform future strategies 
and tactics. This would help to establish 
counter-measures to constrain the 
harms induced following terror attacks, 
whilst concurrently avoiding any 
interventions that might aggravate the 
situation.
Over the past five years or so, both the mechanics 
and dynamics of terrorism, and how it is reported 
via media sources, have altered dramatically.  There 
has been a diversification in terms of ideological 
motivations, and a shift to a full-spectrum of attack 
methodologies, ranging from bombings to knife and 
vehicle-based attacks. Over the same period, the 
logics of media and the information environment 
have been fundamentally transformed.
In the aftermath of terror attacks, the multiple 
competing narratives circulating are not all 
controlled, or controllable, by the authorities. They 
are occasioned by the immediate ability of the public 
to participate in shaping the story.  This means 
that journalists are not as dependent upon official 
sources for information as they were in the past, yet 
they operate in an increasingly competitive media 
market to be the first to ‘break’ stories.
Additional complexity is added to this agenda by the 
implicit suggestion in the available literature that 
the dynamics of social reaction may not be the same 
across different country contexts. The Canadian 
approach, for instance, tends towards a slower 
release of substantive information about the crime 
or any suspects than is typical in the UK or USA. That 
this assertion remains implicit, however, reflects a 
distinct lack of systematic comparative research in 
this field.
One further area of reflection concerns the current 
state-of-the-art in terms of understanding the social 
impacts of new technology trends. For example, 
in the preceding passages it has been noted that 
large numbers of bots are now used to break news 
about important global events online. However, it 
is far from clear what impacts these actually have. 
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Current attempts to gauge the influence achieved 
by communications on social media are overly 
dependent upon quantified ‘reach’ and ‘impression’ 
metrics. However, these only count numbers of social 
media users ‘touched’ by the information, rather 
than whether any actual changes in the recipients’ 
thoughts, feelings or actions were induced. 
Broader understanding about what happens in the 
aftermath of terror attacks, and the role of media and 
social media in shaping these processes, is impeded 
by the lack of systematic comparative case analyses 
looking across multiple incidents to diagnose 
common patterns and differences in respect of 
different modes of terrorist violence.  Seeking to 
redress this balance should be a priority in the future 
commissioning of research in this area.   Preparing 
the ground for such development work, this analysis 
has been shaped by two underlying premises. 
First, we need to incorporate a more sophisticated 
appreciation of the complexities of the contemporary 
media ecology and the roles performed by different 
actors in terms of the communications they make. 
Second, by attending to the temporal dimension, 
there are certain patterns present in terms of what 
communications happen when, in the aftermaths of 
terrorist attacks. Illuminating generalisable patterns 
is important insofar as they afford the possibility of 
prediction and anticipation; precursors for preparing 
meaningful policy and practice interventions. 
Overall, both policy and research attention has 
neglected the post-event situation. Pragmatically, 
if it is accepted that despite best efforts, it will 
not be possible to prevent all future threats and 
plots, then there are counter-measures that can 
be implemented to constrain the harms that occur. 
In engaging with this challenge, the framework 
developed herein is designed to provide a structured 
approach to understanding the complex and multi-
faceted ways in which media and social media 
communications influence such processes.
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APPENDIX: 
Research Design and 
Methodology
KNOWLEDGE MAPPING 
126 Boolean searching is a system of showing relationships between sets by using the words AND, OR, and NOT which can assist in database searching by combining or 
limiting terms. 
Quantitative mapping of the literature 
was based upon systematic searching 
of 9 online databases to retrieve and 
investigate all relevant materials that 
matched defined criterion (N=5,490). 
The databases were chosen to cover a range of 
disciplinary bases: Taylor & Francis, JSTORE, Science 
Direct, Sociological Abstracts, PsycINFO, National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ), LexisNexis, Campbell 
Collaboration.   Two other sources not in a relational 
database format were also searched for key terms: 
The International Bibliography SS (ProQuest) and 
Perspectives on Terrorism Bibliography.  Potential 
sources for inclusion in the latter were identified 
manually (N=436) and then refined (N=76; 17%).
Due to the number of databases searched, and 
the extensive and diverse literature within these, 
additional individual and targeted searches were 
developed for each database, so as to strengthen 
the quality and relevancy of the returns.  Retrievals 
were based upon a blend of single item and Boolean 
searches126, organized as follows:
 Focus upon media and social media related issues 
that arise during and after terrorist incidents [search 
terms: media AND terror*ism; social media AND 
terror*ism]
 The public reaction to terrorist events online or 
offline [search terms: reaction AND terror*ism; 
public AND terror*ism]
 The formulation of a narrative and definition of 
the situation by governments, the media, and social 
media, and key influencers within these mediums 
[narrative AND framing; communication AND 
terrorism; etc.]
 Case study searches based around specific 
locations where known high-profile events took 
place. For example - Boston marathon bombings, 
Mumbai, Paris attacks, Tunisia, etc. [search terms: 
terror*ism AND location (e.g. Boston); bombing AND 
location; etc.].
Testing different combinations of search-terms, the 
more successful returns and matches were rapidly 
established. ‘Successful’ matches were defined in 
terms of the number and relevancy of the materials 
which each brought back. Around 40 different Boolean 
search terms, with different levels of specificity (or 
extent), were trialed before arriving at the best 10 
term combinations.   Figure A1 opposite shows each 
search term as a percentage of all returns, from which 
it can be seen that counter-terrorism is a dominant 
theme in the existing literature, accounting for just 
over 25% of all returns. Figure A1 displays all 12 key 
search term combinations and the number of returns 
for the different individual databases investigated. 
An initial scan and assessment of the identified 
materials was conducted to identify the most relevant 
sources. There was, for example, a considerable 
amount of non-empirical research, concerned with 
mass media and terrorism in general, rather than 
public reactions and impacts, that was not included 
in the more detailed analysis. Two researchers 
independently assessed the returns by reading 
all the abstracts to confirm inclusion or exclusion 
according to the degree of relevancy.  Additional 
references were identified and included within the 
assessment process by reading the primary sources 
and tracking down the citations.
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The quantification data set out in Figure 1 and Table 1 should be understood as an ‘indicator’ rather than ‘measure’ 
of the relative distribution of the research literature. This is because a number of relevant sources of material 
were identified through routes other than the database searches.
Figure A1:  Database search returns as percentage of total returns.
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NAME OF SEARCHABLE DATABASE
KEY TERM 
COMBINATION 
*NUMBER OF 
RETURNS
TAYLOR 
AND 
FRANCIS 
ONLINE
127
JSTORE
128
SCIENCE 
DIRECT
129
NCJRS . 
GOV
SOC 
ABSTRACTS
130
PSYCINFO.
131
NJU
132
LEXIS 
NEXIS
133
CAMPB. 
COLLAB.
134
TOTAL
Media + Terror*Ism 92 38 103 438 83 9 2 261 2 1028
Social Media + 
Terror*Ism
15 8 63 158 8 0 1 174 0 427
Communication + 
Terror*Ism
27 7 200 111 18 0 2 285 0 650
Narrative + 
Terror*Ism 
13 10 46 63 11 2 0 94 1 240
Online + Terror*Ism 8 1 71 0 0 1 0 177 0 258
Online + 
Attack 8 8 0 0 1 2 0 124 0 143
Reaction + 
Terror*Ism
8 13 0
135 1 3 0 178 0 338
Public + Terror*Ism 81 120 0 0 0 22 0 631 0 854
Terror*Ism*Ist + 
[Place]  
107 22 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 133
Bomb*Ing + [Place] 7 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 11
Shooting + [Place] 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12
Counter-Terror*Ism 9 153 187 1000 43 0 4 0 0 1396
Total 387 380 670 1905 165 39 17 1924 3 5490
Table 2. Searchable database key terms and returns, number.
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